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PASSIVE USE OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM FOR
SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES AND THE
FREQUENCY ALLOCATION PROCESS
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INTRODUCTION

A

MONG the most pliant of the natural resources exploited by
technological man is the radio spectrum. Broadcasting, twoway communications of diverse kinds, data transmissions, and radar
illustrate some of the uses of this resource which have become so
entwined in the fabric of everyday life and commerce that modem
society is inconceivable without them. Worldwide telecommunications investments are so vast as to be virtually uncounted, and the
amount is increasing rapidly. Yet, the radio spectrum is a unique
kind of resource. It is capable of use by all, but it is functionally
finite. If there are more than a certain number of users, they will
cause intolerable interference with one another. To avoid such
interference a complex system of regulation has been created in the
United States and internationally. While frequency-management
agencies have done a remarkable job in coping with a nearly impossible task, the continuing explosive growth of demand for the
use of radio frequencies now threatens to saturate the spectrum.
This article focuses on passive radio spectrum users who conduct scientific studies of radio signals generated by non-human
agencies. At present there are three categories': radio astronomers
• J.D., 1978, Univ. of Santa Clara; Ph.D., 1971, Univ. of Mich.; M.A., 1967,
Univ. of Kan.; B.A., 1965, Brown Univ.
•* J.S.D., LL.M., 1969 and 1965, Yale Univ.; J.D., A.B., 1958 and 1953, Univ.
of Pa. George Alexander is Dean and Professor of Law at Univ. of Santa Clara.
1 See Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union, art. I.
(rev, by Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space
Telecommunications, July 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435) [hereinafter cited as Radio Regulations]; Sagan & Drake, The Search for Extraterrestrial

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

who concern themselves with the study of naturally generated
signals of cosmic origin; scientists who concern themselves with
the study from space of naturally generated signals of terrestrial
origin; and scientists engaged in the Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence (SETI), which has as its goal the discovery of artificially generated signals of cosmic origin. These uses of the spectrum differ from all others in several important respects: 1) they
transmit no signal of their own, but only receive signals generated
by processes beyond human control; 2) the signals sought to be
detected are thought to be extremely weak by normal telecommunications standards; 3) these signals may not be observed with equal
convenience anywhere in the spectrum, but generally must be
looked for at specific frequencies determined by the laws of nature;
and 4) in an arena dominated by economic giants they are enterprises which earn no profit, involve no vast expenditures, produce
no immediate product, and gain little publicity. Yet they are possessed of a social value which is both enormous and unique. Indeed,
it would be no exaggeration to state that the passive scientific uses
of the radio spectrum may ultimately provide the key to future
progress and perhaps the very survival of the human race. Two
possibilities, among many, serve to illustrate this point: the prospective discoveries of new laws of physics and of extraterrestrial
civilizations at least as advanced as our own.
Radio astronomy discovered that galactic nuclei release an utterly fantastic quantity of energy in a volume of space perhaps no
larger than that occupied by our own solar system. This energy
release' actually exceeds the combined thermonuclear energy generation of the thousands of billions of stars that constitute a galaxy
like our own Milky Way, which is one hundred thousand light
years' across.' A growing number of physicists suspect that it can
only be explained by the operation of still undiscovered laws of
physics. Since we believe that intense gravitational fields can interIntelligence, 232 SCIENTnFIc AMERICAN 80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sagan &
Drake].
'See Burbidge, The Nuclei of Galaxies, 8 ANN. RIv. ASTRON. & ASTROPHYS.
369 (1970).
'A light year is a measure of distance, and one light year is the distance that
light travels in a year. Since the speed of light is 186,000 miles per second, one
light year is equal to approximately 6,000,000,000,000 miles.
IC.W. ALLEN, ASTROPHYSICAL QuANTrrms 282 (3d ed. 1973).
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act with matter to produce huge amounts of energy, and since our
present understanding of gravity is clearly incomplete, these laws
would probably be new theories of gravitation." Discovery of such
laws could provide the key to new technologies presently as unimaginable as computers, lasers, and nuclear power were a century
ago. The beneficial impact is as impossible to foresee as was the
impact of the development of the printing press. It is conceivable
that the ability to create and control local gravitational fields could
make possible the conversion into energy of the entire rest mass
of ordinary rock. Given such great amounts of energy we could
build vast orbiting space farms to grow as much food as we willed,
move our heavy-polluting industries to airless planets where they
would do no harm, transmute one element into another at will,
and terraform Mars, Venus, and other planets to make homes for
our surplus population. Fantastic though this sounds, it may well
be what the future holds. Should it come to pass, it is more than
likely that we will owe part of our good fortune to the interception
and interpretation of a radio signal falling upon the Earth from
deep in space.
The second possibility, that the immediate future will see mankind's first contact with intelligent extraterrestrial life," is of no less
consequence than the first. We understand the origin of our planetary' system and the subsequent development of living organisms
on Earth sufficiently well to require us to believe that life-bearing
planets must be very common in our galaxy. Probably hundreds
of thousands of these planets have already evolved civilizations
more advanced than our own.' It is not impossible that some of
these have learned how to travel over the vast distances between
the stars, perhaps using physical laws of which we yet know nothing. Whether this be true or not, it will certainly be economical
for them to communicate with one another by sending out radio
signals.' It may be possible that a few have developed a sufficiently
high degree of altruism that they have deliberately sent out mes-

'See
6

C. MISNER, K. THoRNE, & J. WHEELER, GRAVITATION (1973).
I.S. SIKLovsKII & C. SAGAN, INTELLIGENT
LIF IN THE UNIVERSE (1966); INTERSTELLAR COMMUNICATIONS: SCIENTIFIC
PERSPECr S (Ponnamperuma & Cameron, eds. 1974).
See references cited note 6 supra.

See Sagan & Drake, supra note 1;

'Id.
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sages designed to be intercepted by and helpful to an emerging
technological civilization with all the problems we currently face.'
These are not the only kinds of signals we can possibly expect
to discover emanating from an extraterrestrial civilization. We can
anticipate that we may detect signals generated for purposes other
than interstellar communication, but inadvertently broadcast into
space, and it is important that we try to do so. In just this manner
we are broadcasting our presence to any who may be listening.
For twenty years or more our television stations and aircraft acquisition radars have been broadcasting radio signals so powerful
that they overwhelm those naturally generated by the Sun." At
our present level of technology we are quite capable of building
equipment which could detect signals of strength comparable to
those produced by strong terrestrial transmitters at a distance of
hundreds of light years. It must be assumed that any nearby advanced civilization will become aware of us as soon as the signals
we have sent out reach them. What attitude such a civilization
might take toward us cannot be predicted," but it is not impossible
that within the lifetime of readers of this article, or that of their
children, Earth might be visited by a ship from the stars. The importance of searching for radio signals from extraterrestrial civilizations needs no more emphasis than this.
It will probably not surprise the knowledgeable reader to find
that science is far ahead of law in this field and that the law does
not expressly address passive radio reception. United States telecommunications law is embodied almost entirely in the Communications Act of 1934," which superseded the Radio Act of 1927,"
incorporating most of its provisions. Under the 1934 Act, the radio
spectrum is placed under the control of the United States, and the
possibility of private ownership of any frequency or band of frequencies is absolutely precluded."' The Act also provides that
essentially no radio signals (other than those broadcast by the
'Id.
"Sagan & Drake, supra note 1.
" Michaud, Interstellar Negotiation, 49 FOREIGN SERVICE J. 10 (1972).
1" 47 U.S.C. §§

151-606 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The other major United

States telecommunications statute is the Communications Satellite Act of 1962,
47 U.S.C. § 701-44 (1970).
SRadio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
1447 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
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Federal government) may be transmitted within the United States,
its territories, and possessions, or from any vessel, aircraft, or
other mobile station subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
without a license from the Federal Communications Commission;15
moreover, it establishes criteria for license applicants" and reserves
to the President the power to assign frequencies to government
radio stations." The Act contains no authority for the FCC or
the President to regulate the strictly passive reception of radio
signals." Nevertheless, strictly passive reception of radio signals
of non-human origin is possible only at the sufferance of the FCC
and the President. This is a consequence of the fact that, independent of the frequency at which they occur, these signals are
instrinsically so weak that they may be detected only with the most
sensitive receiving equipment modem technology can build. They
will be masked and rendered entirely undetectable by many kinds
of transmissions broadcast with power sufficient to be received by
ordinary and inexpensive equipment. There is great demand for
licenses to transmit by a vast multitude of spectrum users, and
thus, if passive studies of radio signals of non-human origin are to
be possible, there must be an allocation of those frequencies where
such studies may be made, so that licenses to transmit will be
denied to all applicants whose broadcasts would interfere.
The licensing of radio-spectrum users has developed as a twostep process: allocation and assignment." Radio-frequency allocation consists of the dividing of the entire radio spectrum into a
number of frequency bands which are individually reserved to
different classes of users. For example, the band from 21.45 to
21.75 MiHz is among the bands reserved to broadcasting," while
the band from 21.00 to 21.45 MHz is among those allocated to
use by amateurs." Once a band has been allocated to one or more
classes of users, individuals in that class may apply for and be
granted a license to use a particular frequency within that band.22
15Id.
6Id. 5 303, 307-11 (1970 & Supp. V
7Id. 5 305 (1970).

1975).

1Id. 5 301, 303 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1"Id. 5 303(c) (Supp.V 1975).
2047 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1976).
:I Id.
2247

U.S.C. § 303(c) (Supp. V 1975); 47 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) (1976).
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This is the assignment process. Thus an amateur may be assigned a
license to transmit at 21.25 MHz or at some other frequency in
the 21.00 to 21.45 MHz band, but not at 21.55 MHz which is the
band allocated for broadcasting; an aircraft radar may not be
assigned a frequency in either band.
The allocations process is exceedingly complex. In the first place,
there is an international allocations procedure, whereby a set of
Radio Regulations is agreed to by the member countries of the
International Telecommunications Union (153 members in 1977).
These Radio Regulations, which are revised every several years,
include a table of frequency allocations which reserves individual
frequency bands to specific classes of users, called services, for the
purpose of preventing harmful interference to the reception of radio
signals by one nation as a result of radio signals transmitted by
any other nation. They are negotiated for the United States by
the Department of State, are accorded the status of a multilateral
treaty, and are submitted for ratification to the Senate. ' Insofar
as strictly domestic frequency management is concerned, the Communications Act of 1934 gives power to license frequency use
and to allocate frequency bands to the FCC, but section 305 reserves to the President the power to assign frequencies to government radio stations. ' He, in turn, has delegated his authority to
the Office of Telecommunication Policy" (OTP) in the Executive
Office of the President, by Reorganization Plan2 ' subject to Congressional disapproval, and by executive order.' Thus both the
FCC and the OTP have authority to allocate the entire radio spectrum, while in practice actual United States frequency allocations
2

3Radio

Regulations, supra note 1.

" See, e.g., Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Nov. 8, 1963, 15 U.S.T.

887, T.I.A.S. No. 5603.
247 U.S.C. § 305 (1970).
"Exec. Order No. 11,556, 3 C.F.R. 283 (1974) (as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,921, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,294 (1976).

"1Reorganization Plan No. I of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 6421 (1970), reprinted
in 84 Stat. 2083 (1970).
"8As of the time of writing, there is speculation that President Carter may
abolish the OTP and delegate its authority to some other agency, as part of his

intended reorganization of the Federal Government. We wish to emphasize that
our discussions of the powers of the OTP are based on the authority conferred
upon the President by statute. A mere redelegation of that authority would change

none of our essential conclusions.
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closely follow the International Radio Regulations, which are negotiated by the State Department. It is a remarkable fact that, despite this patent conflict of authorities, of the vast number of disputes concerning radio spectrum usage which have been litigated,
essentially every one has been concerned with the assignment of a
frequency license to an individual user. Almost none has been
concerned with the allocation of frequency bands to services.
Nevertheless, we feel that allocation, especially with respect to the
passive services, raises a number of interesting legal issues which
merit discussion.
The approach we adopt is first to explore the general nature of
rights in the radio spectrum and to consider the operation of the
specific federal agencies which have been set up to administer
these rights. We then consider how frequency management by
those agencies is impacted by international spectrum usage treaties
to which the United States is a party. At that point we will hopefully have established an appropriate foundation for the consideration of the standards, established by statute and by judicial decision, which govern frequency allocations to all spectrum users.
We then examine in detail the application of these standards to
the allocation of frequency bands to the passive services and to
protection of those services against interference from users who
have been allocated different bands. Our discussion leads to the
conclusion that their special nature requires that they be treated
differently from other telecommunications services. In particular,
we argue that the statutes and case law imply there are circumstances where there should be preferred allocations of particular
frequency bands to the passive services. Finally, we explore the
remedies available to the passive services in the event of adverse
agency action.
Before launching our legal study, however, it may be useful to
engage in a very approximate and elementary discussion of the
physics of radio waves in order to ensure understanding of the
technical terms which must be used in this paper and to make
clear that there are physical characteristics of radio signals, about
which man can do nothing, which place important constraints on
radio spectrum management. The technically oriented reader will
probably desire to skip to Section III, The Frequency Allocation
Process.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

II. THE PHYSICS OF RADIO SIGNALS
In general, radio waves are a kind of electromagnetic radiation,
or light, as it is commonly called, which, along with infrared and
ultraviolet radiation, x-rays and gamma-rays, fall outside the frequency range to which the human eye is sensitive. The generation
of all kinds of electromagnetic radiation is understood today in
terms of the highly mathematical laws of relativistic quantum-field
physics. However, it is possible to explain it in lay terms, which,
though crude and greatly over-simplified, will present a picture
that is not seriously incorrect.
Any electric charge produces electric and magnetic fields which
exert a force on any other electric charge, which may be located
some distance away. This force will cause the other electric charges
to change over a period of time their state of motion (their speed,
which may have initially been zero, their direction, or both). If
the first electric charge is somehow caused to vary the speed or
direction of its own motion, the field it generates, and hence the
forces which that field exerts on the other charges, will change.
However, this field, which pervades all space outward from the
charge to very great distances, does not change instantly over its
whole extent; rather the charge propagates outward from the
charge with the speed of light, approximately 186,000 miles per
second. Thus other charges will feel the effect of the changed field
only after the passage of a certain period of time following the
change in velocity of the first charge, and the length of this time
delay will be equal to their distance from the charge divided by
the speed of light.
Imagine that we generate an electric current and cause it to flow
through a simple wire circuit between two terminals of a generator.
An electric current is nothing but a collection of moving electric
charges, and its strength depends on the number of charges which
cross any point in the wire per unit interval of time. Thus if we
imagine that there is a dial on the generator which can be turned
to control the number of charges flowing through the wire, we can
cause the current to increase or decrease at will. Suppose that
initially there is no current flowing through the wire, and we first
turn the dial on the generator slowly so that the current in the
wire increases to its maximum strength. Then, suppose we turn
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the dial the other way so the current decreases again to zero, but
do not stop there. Let us turn the dial so the current begins to
increase again. Finally, let us continue turning the dial back and
forth. What is the effect of all this? The electric charges of which
the current is composed will be caused to move through the wire,
and the strength of the current will always be changing. Clearly
these charges generate electric and magnetic fields, as our single
charge did before, and the strength of these fields will change in
proportion to the changes in the current. Since the current changes
in a continuous and periodic fashion, the fields will also change
continuously and periodically, but those changes will take time to
propagate out to points distant from the wire. Thus the electric
and magnetic fields around the wire would appear, if we could see
them, to be changing their strength in a wave-like manner. If we
draw an analogy between the strengths of our fields and the level
of the sea, what we observe would look exactly like the ocean
waves with which everyone is familiar. Each wave in the strengths
of the fields would consist of a crest, at which the fields are strongest, followed by a trough, at which the fields are weakest; these
crests and troughs would move outward from the wire at the speed
of light. It is these wave-like changes in field strengths that we call
electromagnetic radiation."'
These electromagnetic waves have certain characteristics that
can be understood by anyone who has watched the ocean crash
upon the beach. The height of a wave, or vertical distance from
its crest to its trough, is called its amplitude, and, for our electromagnetic waves, depends upon the maximum strength of the current in our wire. If we move the dial back and forth over only small
distances, we will produce waves of small amplitude; rotating the
dial over large distances will produce waves of large amplitude.
Furthermore, we can produce waves as rapidly or as slowly as we
want by spinning the dial rapidly or slowly. The rate at which we
produce waves is called the frequency of the radiation; it can be
measured by counting the number of wave crests (or troughs) that
pass a given point each second. One wave, or cycle, per second, is
'Actually

any change in electromagnetic field strength which propagates

through space is considered to be electromagnetic radiation and can be described
mathematically as wave-like in form. See generally HOYLE, ASTRONOMY AND
COSMOLOGY: A MODERN COURSE PT. II (1975); J.D. KRAUS & K.R. CARVER,
ELECTROMAGNETICS

(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KRAUS

& CARVER].
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called one Hertz, in honor of a nineteenth century physicist who
contributed greatly to our understanding of electromagnetic phenomena; the Hertz will be used throughout this paper to denote
the fundamental unit of measure for frequency. One other parameter describing electromagnetic radiation is the wavelength;
this is the distance between successive wavecrests or wavetroughs.
The product of the wavelength and the frequency is equal to the
speed of the waves, which is the speed of light. Radio waves are
electromagnetic waves with frequencies below several hundred
billion Hertz;"0 the radio spectrum has been allocated in the United
States over the entire frequency range betwen 10 KHz and 275
GHz.31
Electromagnetic waves carry energy, and it is this property which
makes them useful, for we can extract that energy and do work
with it. For example, if there is a second wire at some distance
from our first, electromagnetic waves which cross it will produce
changes in the motions of the charges in it. These changes are
identical to the acceleration of surrounding electric charges caused
by the acceleration of a single charge that we discussed above. Such
induced charge motions in the second wire are nothing but an
electric current, the strength of which can be measured. Recall
that by varying the rate at which we spin the dial of our generator,
we can vary the wave-frequency, and by changing the amount by
which we turn it, we can change the wave-amplitude. Thus we can
modulate either the amplitude or frequency of any electromagnetic
wave we generate in any manner we choose, and measure these
modulations with an appropriate receiver, such as our second wire,
at some distance away. In particular, we can code the modulations
to carry a message which we can then decipher. Crudely, this
30 One billion Hertz is called one gigahertz (abbreviated GHz); one million

Hertz, one megahertz (MHz); and one thousand Hertz, one kilohertz (KHz).
31 Higher frequencies than this are included in what is called the infrared,
while frequencies of visible light lie in the range 400 to 800 thousand GHz, and
waves of still higher frequency are called ultraviolet rays, x-rays, and gamma
rays. The upper limit of allocated frequencies has been increased as technologies
to transmit and receive at higher frequencies have been developed; in 1937 this
limit was but 300 MHz. (For a short history of frequency allocations see Note,
The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation: Abatement
Through Market Distribution,53 IowA L. REv. 437 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation]).
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describes the basic principle of radio communications." It remains
only to point out a few very important characteristics of this
process.
Just as it is possible to transmit at any desired frequency, it is
also possible to design a receiver which will be sensitive to waves
with a certain frequency. This statement must be somewhat qualified, however. Any transmitter will produce radiation over a range
of frequencies (called the bandwidth of the signal) with essentially
the same power (which is proportional to the amplitude of the
wave, squared) at each frequency in the range." This is true for
a number of reasons. For instance, in our simplified example of a
wire attached to a generator, the electrons which constitute the
current flowing through the wire will run into each other and
the various atoms which make up the wire; this means the
fields they individually produce will change at different rates, and
the emitted radiation will therefore cover a band of frequencies.
As a practical matter it may or may not be desirable to produce a
signal with a wide bandwidth. What is of crucial importance from
the standpoint of regulating spectrum use, however, is the fact that,
for reasons of physics outside the scope of this article, if one
attempts to generate a signal at one frequency, one will in fact
generate signals at all frequencies, although the power of the
signals at frequencies far outside one's intended bandwidth will
be very much less than at frequencies within it. But the power as
a function of distance does not fall off continuously. There are
special frequencies, called harmonics, which occur at integer multiples of the fundamental frequency, where the power in the signal
will be quite large-indeed, it is possible in some physical situations to produce harmonics with power comparable to that at the
fundamental frequency.
This, of course, is of major consequence to radio spectrum usage.
If the FCC licenses a television station to transmit at 750 MHz,
but has not allocated frequencies above 806 MHz to television,
then, as a consequence of the physical laws governing radiating
systems, that station will not only produce weak signals at all fre32 The familiar designations AM and FM refer to coding by amplitude modulation and frequency modulation respectively. See generally KRAus & CARvER,

supra note 29.
33 See generally KR.us & CARVER, supra note 29, chs. 13, 14.
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quencies both above and below 806 MHz, but it will also produce
potentially strong signals at 1500, 2250, and 3000 MHz, and the
power in these signals will be very great indeed where the transmitter in question is intrinsically as powerful as a television station.
This unavoidable out-of-band radiation is referred to as spurious
radiation. It cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be reduced
in power to almost any level desired, by appropriate measures
such as the use on transmitters of filters, which act electrically to
decrease power at out-of-band frequencies before the radiation
leaves the transmitter. To do this costs money, however, and the
lower a spectrum-user is required to keep the power in his harmonics and other spurious radiation, the more it will cost him.
A very important task of the FCC and OTP is to set maximum
permissible power limits for spurious radiation; such standards are
set by the International Radio Regulations as well.
The power received at a given location from a specific transmitter depends not only on the power radiated by the transmitter,
but also on one's distance from it. The power carried by any light
wave, radio waves included, falls off as the square of the distance
from its origin. Thus it is possible to license two transmitters at
the same frequency without the danger that they will harmfully
interfere with one another if they are separated by sufficient distance that the power in the respective transmitted signals has decreased to a level too low to be noticed after they have crossed this
distance. Furthermore, radiation propagates only in a straight line,
while the Earth is curved. Thus, if one site is below the horizon
as seen from another, radiation transmitted from one of the sites
will not ordinarily be expected to reach the other. It is for this
reason that signals intended to be received a large distance away
must be transmitted from atop a very high tower or from one
relay station to another. The atmosphere can act to scatter radiation, however, and this results in a small fraction of the transmitted
power being able to reach sites below the transmitter's horizon.
Advantage is sometimes taken of this fact to transmit over long
distances by using very high power transmitters and avoiding the
expense of building relay stations; on the other hand, it is obviously possible for powerful transmitters inadvertently to cause
harmful interference to someone, though he be over the horizon,
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even at considerable distance. Moreover, just like visible light,
radio waves can be reflected from objects which they strike. Reflection off aircraft, and even space satellites and debris, can cause
a signal to fall at a point over the horizon far from its origin, and,
if it had enough power initially, to cause harmful interference there.
Indeed, at very low frequencies, the Earth's ionosphere, a region
high in the atmosphere which contains charged particles, reflects
radio waves, and commercial radio broadcasting makes use of this
to deliver signals to home receivers. As might by now be guessed,
the propagation characteristics of the atmosphere not only vary
with radio-wave frequency, but also with its temperature, moisture
content, and other weather conditions, especially at high frequencies where water vapor becomes a strong radio-wave absorber.
Finally, we note that it is possible to design antennas ' which
can beam radiation generated by a transmitter primarily into a
relatively narrow cone in one direction or which can receive
radiation primarily from a similar narrow cone. However, it is a
general characteristic of such antennas that they transmit signals
at some power level in all directions and also receive signals from
all directions. The factor by which an antenna can increase the
power that would be put out by the transmitter alone radiating in
all directions is called its on-axis gain; the factor by which the
power radiated in directions other than along the axis is increased
or decreased over that broadcast by the transmitter is called its
off-axis gain. A typical large antenna may have an on-axis gain of a
million or more, which falls rapidly to unity at distances of ten to
twenty degrees off-axis, while the off-axis gain at a distance from
the axis of 90 degrees is typically around 0.01. The off-axis gain,
however, never falls to zero, even behind the antenna. By making
it possible to focus transmitted radiation and to amplify received
radiation coming primarily from one direction, antennas make
possible the use of lower transmitter powers. They decrease possibilities for harmful interference even further by reducing the signal
power transmitted in the direction of other spectrum users who are
located at large angles to the line of the antenna-axis.
The need for regulation of radio communication arises because
of the characteristics of electromagnetic radiation. In what follows,
84

1d. ch. 14.
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we will try to avoid discussions of physics as much as possible,
but it is essential to remember that, in the telecommunications
area especially, human law must be subservient to the laws of
nature.

III.

THE FREQUENCY ALLOCATION PROCESS

A. The Nature of Rights in the Radio Spectrum
Before examining the detailed relation between the FCC, OTP,
and State Department, it will be useful to consider briefly the
nature of the right that the recipient of a frequency assignment
acquires. What is ordinarily meant by the term "spectrum" is the
aggregation of all possible frequencies which any electromagnetic
wave may have. But a frequency is not even a tangible physical
entity; it is merely the number of wave crests that pass a given
point per unit interval of time. Both man and nature can generate
an electromagnetic wave which has any particular frequency, but,
that is not a possessory act with respect to that frequency," nor
does it bar another from transmitting waves at the same frequency.
However, two such waves at the same physical location will interfere with one another and become useless for telecommunications
purposes since it will have become impossible to receive them individually. Human creativity has little hope of devising a technology
which can make this otherwise; the problem is essentially equivalent to that of removing from the Mississippi River just that
water which has flowed into it from the Ohio."
Thus by a strictly physical argument it can be seen that importance attaches only to the exclusive right to generate electromagnetic waves at a given frequency and in a particular locality.
While the possession of material objects must be contemplated
according to the principles of personal and real property law, the
award of exclusive rights to selected members of a society need
be governed by no such considerations. United States telecommunications statutes have recognized this from the beginning. The

8It

may, however, be a possessory act with respect to the wave, since the

wave is a physical entity, and to create something could be considered an exer-

cise of dominion or control over it. But once generated, electromagnetic waves,
by their nature, immediately begin to travel and are no longer significantly subject to human control.
"See generally KRAus & C&RVER, supra note 29.
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Radio Act of 1927, and subsequently the Communications Act
of 1934, encoded into law the principle of physics that radio frequencies may not be possessed; this has not changed in the years
since. It is possible to acquire only a right to transmit at some
frequency for a limited period of time under a license granted by
Federal authority, and that right is subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed."' That one may not acquire property
rights in the electromagnetic spectrum but may only receive a
revocable license to transmit at a given frequency carries with it
the corollary that revocation of such license gives rise to no fifth
amendment issue of compensation for taking of property. This is
important, since telecommunications is a multi-billion dollar industry. Although licenses for frequency-use are not awarded in exchange for value, the recipient of a license may invest huge sums
of money in transmitting and receiving equipment. He thereby
acquires a very real economic interest in keeping his license, but
this economic interest would not be compensated should that license be revoked.
This was established as the correct interpretation of the law by
judicial decision following passage of the Radio Act and remains
so under the Communications Act. In American Bond & Mortgage Co. v. United States,- appellant's license had been revoked
by the Federal Radio Commission for no other reason than to reduce interference. Appellant had expended over $100,000 in building its radio station and claimed that it was entitled to compensation for a taking of property. This claim was denied. Appellant's
property was not taken. It retained its station and all equipment
located therein and could sell them to any buyer it could find,
U.S.C. S 301 (1970) provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter . .. to maintain the control of
the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign
radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.
Nearly identical language formerly appeared in the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1162.
47 U.S.C. SS 304, 309(h) also bar the acquisition of a vested interest in any
frequency by a licensee. Accord, Aschbaker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327
(1945).
852 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1931).
1747
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though perhaps for less than what it paid. All it lost was a right
which was granted subject to certain conditions, including that it
might be revoked to reduce interference. Certainly this right was
valuable, and revocation of its license apparently brought appellant
financial loss. Yet appellant must have known it ran this risk when
it first sought the license. An applicant who accepts a government
permit which is subject to certain conditions "cannot later assert
rights which were surrendered in order to secure the permit.""
This principle is especially important when the passive scientific
services are considered. Given the nature of scientific discovery,
it may be realized tomorrow that there exists signals, of great importance to the advancement of learning, in a frequency band
which yesterday was thought to be without scientific significance.
Indeed, this has happened many times in the past twenty years."
Today, equipment investments are so large that users of a frequency
may wish to claim a right to compensation should their further
use of it be barred by a reallocation to a passive service. But to this
they are not entitled.'
B. Spectrum Management by the FCC and the OTP

As has already been noted, both the FCC and the OTP have
power to allocate the entire frequency spectrum, the former to
private and commercial users and the latter to government agencies.
It is the purpose of this section to survey critically the law under
which this dual authority has been allowed to develop. We shall
see that dual authority may compromise the ability of the FCC
to fulfill its congressional mandate; we fear that this especially
jeopardizes the rights of economically weak spectrum users, such
as the passive services.
The Communications Act explicitly mandates that the FCC is
to define classes of spectrum users," allocate specific bands of frequencies thereto, ' and assign frequencies within the allocated
bands, and only within these bands, to individual members of
oId. at 320; see also Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
e.g., Moran, Radio Observations of Galactic Masers, in FRONTIERS OF
ASTROPHYSICS (E. Avrett ed. 1976).
' See e.g., American Bond & Mortgage v. United States, 52 F.2d 318 (7th
Cir. 1931).
4247 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1970).
43
Id. § 303(c) (Supp. V 1975).
40See,
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these classes." Moreover, the Act requires that neither frequency
assignmentsi' nor allocations ' be made by whim or caprice, or at
the subjective pleasure of the Commissioners, but defines a criterion which must be determinative of the merits of both: that the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity" be served. It is a
standard that is referred to many times throughout the Act, and
it is clear that Congress intended the entire field of radio spectrum
management to be impressed with it." Although frequency-allocation problems have seldom given rise to litigation, frequencyassignment disputes have resulted in a copious supply' of judicial
decisions interpreting what is mean by "public interest, convenience, or necessity." The Communications Act, however, does more
than merely recite that public interest, convenience, or necessity
are to govern radio spectrum usage. It makes several statements
of public policy which delimit that standard and restrict its interpretation, if the Act be read self-consistently as a whole.
Paramount is the policy implicit in section 301 (f) which gives to
the Commission power to "make such regulation not inconsistent
with law as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between
stations."' It was the need to halt interference between unregulated
broadcast stations operating on the same frequency which gave
rise to the Radio Act of 1927. This Act was incorporated largely
unmodified into the Communications Act, and the importance of
preventing interference was recognized by the earliest judicial decisions in this area."' Indeed, it is essential to keep in mind that
47 C.F.R. § 2.102(a) (1976).
" 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
4Id.
S5 303, 307(a).
44Id.;

47See KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1931).
" See cases cited in Section V infra.
4947 U.S.C. § 301(f) (1970).
"0 See American Bond & Mortgage v. United States, 52 F.2d 318, 322 (7th
Cir. 1931):
The purpose of the federal regulation of radio broadcasting stations was obvious. The confusion which resulted from the uncontrolled operation of such stations was ruinous to all commercial
enterprises engaged therein, as well as destructive of the benefit
which the public enjoyed as a result of the development of the radio
industry. There was but one effective method of regulation, to wit,
through licensing of stations and the limiting of their use to specific wave lengths and to certain kilowatt power.
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were it not for the physical fact that electromagnetic waves of the
same frequency do interfere with each other, the generation of such
waves by one individual could cause no harm to any other individual, and a congressional attempt to regulate this kind of activity

would probably violate the first amendment. 1 By the very laws
of nature, if one individual is to have a right to transmit waves
with a certain frequency which are to be capable of reception,
another may not have that right. Individual frequencies being
limited in number, the sharing of such rights among the members

of society is properly a matter for a law-making tribunal. A system
of frequency allocations or assignments which purports to divide
rights to spectrum use among competing individuals for the public
benefit but fails to prevent these individuals from interfering with

each other is nothing more than a sham. Consideration of this fact
is essential if interpretation of the provisions of the Communications Act is to serve any useful purpose; it will be especially relevant when we examine the need of the passive services to be pro-

tected against spurious radiation."
Authority for the FCC to regulate spurious radiation is explicitly
granted by the Communications Act,' which also mandates to

31 Licensing necessarily and intentionally bars certain communications. The
issue of whether the Communications Act is a restriction of freedom of speech
that violates the First Amendment has been litigated, and the United States Supreme Court has upheld the Act. The essence of the justification for regulation
is scarcity. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89
(1969):
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. If 100
persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies
to allocate, all of them may have the same "right" to a license; but
if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few
can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airways. It
would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and
furthering communications, prevented the Government from making
radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and
by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum.
See also Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278, 281 (2d
Cir. 1965): "Here is truly a situation where if everybody could say anything,
many could say nothing." Accord, California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United
States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
5
See Section V infra.
"47 U.S.C. § 303(e) (1970).
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that agency the duty of increasing the efficiency of spectrum usage."
These are intimately related to each other, for the more stringent
the limits which are imposed on spurious radiation, the closer
together in frequency it will be possible for different users to operate without their spurious radiation causing mutual interference.
Thus the available frequency spectrum can accommodate more
users if they are all required to make extra expenditures to limit
their spurious radiation, and this is an increasingly important consideration in an era of shortage of available spectrum space.
Regulation of spurious radiation is not the only possible way of
improving efficiency of spectrum usage, however; for example, the
FCC can also mandate the use of highly directional antennas and
set maximum power limits in order to increase the spatial density
of non-interfering transmitters at each frequency." Indeed, the
Communications Act requires that all radio transmitters use the
minimum amount of power necessary to carry out the communication desired." In addition, the frequency allocation scheme itself,
by placing services located in different geographical regions, or
which operate typically at different times, in the same frequency
band, can contribute greatly to maximizing efficiency of spectrum
usage. The latter is no more than one element of the public interest, however, and the Act seems to contemplate that the FCC have
at least some discretion to weigh it against other elements thereof.
On the one hand, the public interest would be ill-served by a
regulatory scheme which maximized the number of frequencies
available for assignment but imposed such heavy economic burdens
on their potential assignees as to make them unprofitable. On the
other hand, neither could the public interest tolerate a scheme
which minimized the economic burden on spectrum users but resulted in unnecessary diminution of the frequency channels available to them.
In addition, the Communications Act delimits the public interest by restricting the eligibility for a license of one who has violated
the antitrust laws,"7 and by limiting the power of the FCC to license
where a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of inter" Id. § 303(g).
" Id. S 303(c)-(f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
- Id. 5 324.

5TId.S 313.
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state commerce may result." Furthermore, section 701 (b) of the
Communications Satellite Act' requires that communication satellite systems be planned with "attention . . . directed toward . . .
efficient and economical use of the electromagnetic frequency
spectrum"; this language is stronger than that contained in section
303(g) of the Communications Acte, in that it appears to make
efficient use of the spectrum a requirement for communication
satellite systems, and not merely an element of the public interest
to be weighed against other elements in regulating their use of spectrum space.' Finally, just as various sections of the Communications Act define the meaning of "public interest, convenience, or
necessity," so also do independent pieces of legislation when they
express public policies which may be affected by frequency allocations and licensing; to maintain otherwise would be to imply that
Congress has intended that statutes of the United States should
work at cross purposes to one another. Indeed, the federal courts,
which have the power of judicial review over FCC decisions,"
have approved and required the consideration by the Commission
of diverse public policies, social benefits, and social harms in its
formulation of the public interest.'
The law is explicit and clear with respect to standards for the
frequency management powers of the FCC. With respect to the
same for the OTP, however, it is altogether vague. Historically,
58

Id. § 314.

so47

U.S.C. § 701(b) (1970).

0047 U.S.C. S 303(g) (1970).
This interpretation is supported by the legislative history:
It is apparent that over and above the national policy of operat-

ing the space satellites, essential to a successful program is the efficient and effective allocation of the radio spectrum. The potential of
any communications satellite system is conditioned by certain unalterable truths:

(a) There is only one electromagnetic spectrum.
(b) The spectrum is finite and uniformly distributed throughout
the universe.
(c) It is always and already distressingly crowded.

(d) All telecommunications services, both present and potential,
must use frequencies, and in a manner that does not interfere
with other services.
S. REP. No. 1587, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2269, 2270 (emphasis added).

62 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1970); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S5 701-706
(1970 & Act of Oct. 31, 1976 Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721).
"See Section V infra.
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standard radio broadcasting was one of the first large-scale uses
of the radio spectrum which developed,"4 and it was the proliferation of broadcast stations and the resulting chaotic interference
situation which motivated Congress to pass the Radio Act of 1927."
Various agencies of the federal government had already long been
operating their own radio stations, however, and, unlike private
broadcasters, the government stations did make an attempt to regulate their frequency usage." In 1922, the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC) "' was formed primarily to advise the
Secretary of Commerce on matters of common interest to radio
users; however, it soon acquired as its primary function the coordination of assignments of frequencies to government radio stations. The IRAC, which is composed of representatives of all government agencies which use the radio spectrum, has retained this
function up to the present day, in spite of numerous reorganizations
of the frequency-management structure of the executive branch
which have nominally, at least, subordinated it to other offices."
Since 1970 it has served in an advisory capacity to the Director
of the OTP, 9 who has final authority to assign frequencies to radio
stations owned or operated by the United States."0
In its mode of operation, too, the IRAC appears to differ little
from that of fifty years ago. Any member agency is entitled to
bring to IRAC a request for frequency use. Such a request seems
to be automatically considered justified provided only that space
can be found for it in the spectrum. If there are conflicting demands, or a prior user of the frequencies in question, there will
be an attempt to work out a compromise; should agreement prove
unreachable, final authority to mandate a solution resides with the
Director of the OTP, and, should he be asked to intervene, the
4Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation, supra

note 31.
6See, e.g., American Bond & Mortgage v. United States, 52 F.2d 318 (7th

Cir. 1931), and text quoted, note 50 supra.
"Note,

The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation, supra

note 31.
67

1d.

68 Id.

19Exec. Order No. 11,556 § 10, 3 C.F.R. 283 (1974)
Order No. 11,921, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,294 (1976)).
70

(as amended by Exec.

Id. § 3; Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970 § 1, 35 Fed. Reg. 6421 (1970),
reprinted in 84 Stat. 2083 (1970).
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President.7 There appears to be only incidental consideration of
public interest, convenience, or necessity in this process, and the
law does not require more. The assignment of frequencies to government radio stations is wholly at the discretion of the President,"
and this seems usually to reflect the convenience of a limited number of agencies, the prime concerns of which are often quite different from the broad public interest which Congress intended the
FCC should represent. Since no law limits the frequency bandwidth
which OTP may allocate to government use, disastrous interference between government and private or commercial users has
been avoided only by good-will coordination between the two
agencies. While this article purports to raise no question concerning the good faith of those involved, nevertheless, we question to
what degree this situation allows the FCC to adhere in its decisions
to the congressionally mandated standards.
Furthermore, although decisions of the FCC are subject to
judicial review, the OTP and the IRAC appear to be immune.
Under the judicial review sections of the Administrative Procedure
Act,"3 a court may hold unlawful and set aside an FCC decision
which it finds to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law, or not supported by substantial evidence.'4 Recent court decisions have emphasized that
although a court may not substitute its judgment for that of an
agency nor find facts de novo except where expressly permitted by
law, a decision will nevertheless be found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion where the agency has not based it
on a consideration of all relevant factors, or has made a clear
M

"Exec. Order No. 11,556, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 283 (1974) (as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,921), 41 Fed. Reg. 24,294 (1976)); Reorganization Plan No. I of
1970 S 1, 35 Fed. Reg. 6421 (1970), reprinted in 84 Stat. 2083 (1970).
"247 U.S.C. § 305(a) says that "Government stations shall use such frequencies as shall be assigned to each or to each class by the President." This is qualified by nothing at all that can be construed as a standard or guideline; the words
"public interest, convenience, or necessity" do not appear in S 305(a). Neither
do Exec. Order No. 11,556 § 3, and Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970 S 1
contain any words that might be construed as guidelines for or limitations on
the power of the Director of OTP to assign frequencies to Government radio
stations.
785 U.S.C. S5 701-706 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 31, 1976, Pub. L
No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721.
- Id.

S 706.
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error of judgment."' Courts appear, however, to have no basis for
reviewing decisions of the OTP and the IRAC. The Administrative
Procedure Act removes from the jurisdiction of federal courts
challenges of decisions which constitute "agency action committed
to agency discretion."'" Although this exemption has been interpreted to be a narrow one, not lightly to be presumed in the absence
of a demonstration that such was the clear intent of Congress,"
OTP decisions appear to fall within its scope. The test is whether
"there is a law to apply" to the agency action in question; only
if the agency has a right to make such a decision, unqualified by
statutory standards or legislative intent," are federal courts deprived of jurisdiction. The existence of statutory standards or
legislative intent are to be determined from the context and purpose of the entire statute."0 Applying these criteria, it is difficult
to argue that the President's power to assign frequencies to government radio stations is other than agency action committed to
agency discretion, and therefore not subject to judicial review.
This power is not at all qualified by the wording of section 305(a) 1
and is not discussed elsewhere in the Communications Act. It
might be argued that Congress nevertheless intended the standard
of public interest, convenience, or necessity to apply to government
frequency use since it pervades the Act, and courts have found
that the entire field of spectrum use is impressed with it." This
argument, however, is difficult to maintain in the face of section
323." That section appears to mandate the conclusion that Congress did intend to give the President unfettered discretion to
assign frequencies for government use, since it makes provision for
7E.g.,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975); Nadar v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
m5 U.S.C. S 701 (1970).

7 Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
s Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971).

"Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1975).
"Ness Inv. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Serv., 512
F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975).
1 47 U.S.C. 5 305(a) (1970), quoted in note 72 supra.
12 KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1931).
-"47 U.S.C. 5 323 (1970).
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time sharing between government and commercial or private stations which have independently been assigned the same frequency.
Given the state of radio technology in 1934, inclusion of such a
provision made unlimited presidential discretion to assign government frequencies entirely reasonable." Indeed, there is judicial
authority that presidential decisions with respect to frequency
allocations and assignments for government stations are not reviewable.'
The conflict of authority between the FCC and the OTP is the
result of the perpetuation of an anachronism due to legislative
inertia. That government radio stations should be exempt from
regulation by that authority placed over private and commercial
stations was established by the Radio Act of 1927, and the Communications Act" continued this policy. The exemption was intended to be a limited one, however, and it was not granted haphazardly or without due consideration of the consequences. The
Communications Act, read as a whole, defines a time-sharing
spectrum management scheme which was certainly viable at the
time it was enacted. Unfortunately, it was adapted to the radio
technology of that era, but not to that of ours.
Specifically, the Communications Act exempts government stations from only sections 301 and 303.8' The first of these contains
the requirement that radio stations operate only after receipt of a
federal license, while section 303 describes the powers and duties
of the FCC, including its powers to classify radio stations, allocate
frequency bands to services, and assign frequencies to individual
stations, as well as the requirement that such action be as required
by the public interest, convenience, or necessity. Moreover, section
305 (a) provides explicit and unqualified authority for the President
to exercise these powers of classification, allocation, and assignment
with respect to government radio stations. Had Congress desired,
government stations could have been exempt from more provisions
84 In some special cases, including possibly the passive services, legislative acts
not directly related to telecommunications may set standards which can be taken
as a basis for providing jurisdiction for court review. But this is at most a limited
exception. See Section V infra.

81Bendix Aviation v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361

U.S. 965 (1960). See discussion of this case, this Section infra.
8847 U.S.C. S 305(a) (1970).
8747

U.S.C.

S

301, 303, 305(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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of the Act than sections 301 and 303; indeed they could have been
exempted from the entire Act."" Furthermore, there is explicit language, both in section 305 and in other provisions of the Act,
which constrains the operation of government stations. Thus section 305(a) itself requires that they shall obey FCC rules "designed to prevent interference with other radio stations and the
rights of others," when not transmitting communications or signals
relating to government business. The minimum power requirement
of section 32489 applies to "all radio stations, including those
owned and operated by the United States." It would appear, then,
that the proper construction of the Act is that at least some
standards for the operation of government stations have been
established thereby, though they need not be licensed by the FCC
and receive, instead, their frequency allocation and assignments
from the President.
This is no small exception. It gives the President, and hence his
delegate, the OTP, ° equal power with the FCC to allocate the
entire frequency spectrum. Both agencies appear able, in theory,
to assign the same frequency to different stations, which may then
interfere with each other. Today it may seem incredible that the
Congress, legislating to remedy the chaotic interference situation
that had developed in the 1920's, could have devised a system
with so patent a conflict of authorities that it seems to fail to
establish any mechanism for preventing use of the same frequency
by both the government and private or commercial interests. Yet
there is no provision in the Communications Act which limits in
any way the power of either agency to allocate any frequency.
The key to the situation is section 323,9' to which we have already referred. It provides that where a private or commercial
station and a government station at the same frequency operate
in such close geographical proximity that interference cannot be
avoided, the government station shall transmit only during the
first fifteen minutes of each hour, local standard time, while the
88 For example, in contrast to S 305(a), § 328 exempts stations in the Canal
Zone from §§ 301 to 362.
8947 U.S.C. S 324 (1970).

0

It also applies to any successor delegate that the Carter administration may
designate.
0147 U.S.C. S 323 (1970).
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private or commercial station shall not use its transmitter during
that period of time. This provision was entirely reasonable in 1934
when it was enacted into law, and puts the conflict of authorities
between the FCC and the President in its proper perspective. Congress did indeed foresee that both the FCC and the President
might assign the same frequency to different radio stations, and
that these stations might then be capable of interfering with each
other. Congress, however, did not intend that such interference
occur. It designated and wrote into law a simple time-sharing requirement. The government station would operate during, and
only during, specific periods of time totaling twenty-five percent of
the day, and the private or commercial station would operate only
during the remaining seventy-five percent of the day; both would
then be interference-free. Unfortunately, a rapidly advancing technology made this plan obsolete and unworkable not many years
after section 323 was enacted, but the national legislature has not
to this day seen fit to modernize the law.
In 1934, radio spectrum use was dominated by standard broadcasting. Few things could be more reasonable, should frequencies
prove to be in short supply, than that one radio broadcast station
should go off the air for a short period of time to allow another
to operate at the same frequency." From the World War II era
to the present, however, there have developed a multitude of uses
for the spectrum which do not resemble broadcasting in the least
degree, and for which time-sharing is quite impossible. A modem
airport cannot shut down operations during a portion of every
hour while its radars go off the air, nor can the military shut off
its missile-detection radars periodically for forty-five minutes.'
Business operations transmitting data from one computer to another over radio links cannot operate economically if they must
shut down every hour on the hour. Finally, the passive services
cannot turn off their receivers at specified times, because the time
when nature transmits its radio signals cannot be mandated in advance by mere human law. Given this situation, the FCC and the
92 But under § 323, government stations are not required to
"inmcase of signals or radio communications relating to vessels
vessel requests for information as to course, location, or compass
93 The entire flight time of an ICBM from launch to impact is

go off the air
in distress and
direction."
but thirty min-
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OTP and its predecessors have followed the only course open to
them. They collaborated to ensure that they simply do not assign
two users to the same frequency under circumstances where interference between them is possible." This practice, however, has had
the effect of defeating one of the main purposes of both the Communications and Communications Satellite Acts.
Nothing could be clearer from these statutes than that Congress
intended private and commercial use of the radio spectrum to be
governed by considerations of public interest, convenience, or
necessity. These words appear over and over again in many provisions of both acts. By providing a mechanism for judicial review,
Congress guaranteed that the FCC must give effect to them, and
the courts have repeatedly held that they define a standard to
which FCC decisions must demonstrably conform.' However, it is
by no means clear that the same standard was meant to apply to
the operation of government radio stations. It appears to have been
assumed that no great harm would result if the government, which,
after all, had begun to regulate its own spectrum use through the
IRAC, should take what frequencies it would. In the happenstance
that the FCC, operating independently, should assign the same
frequency to a private or commercial station, they would merely
time-share. An FCC operating independently and according to
public interest, convenience, or necessity is impossible, however,
when it must arrive at its frequency-allocation scheme through
compromise with another agency not bound by that standard,
though having spectrum-management powers equal to its own.
There is little evidence that the IRAC bases its frequency allocations on a consideration of public interest, convenience, or necessity; however, there is evidence that the FCC reallocates frequency
bands to bar private and commercial use, or to allow only uses
compatible with the government use, when such are allocated to
94OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY,
TRUM-UNITED STATES USE AND MANAGEMENT,

THE

RADIO

FREQUENCY SPEC-

at D-1 (Aug. 1975). See also

Biomedical Radio Telemetering, 43 F.C.C.2d 363, 364 (1973); Class E Citizens
Radio Service, 41 F.C.C.2d 147, 148 (1973); Telemetering in the Band 1427-35
MHz, 41 F.C.C.2d 990 (1973).
"See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953); NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942); WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Heitmeyer v. FCC,
995 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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a government service by the IRAC." This has happened even where
the commercial user has substantial economic clout. 7 IRAC deliberations are generally closed, and its decisions do not appear to
be supported by written findings and conclusions on the basis of
which a reviewing body could assure itself that all elements of the
public interest were considered in reaching the decision in question.
Of course, it probably should be presumed that government operations funded by Congress are in the public interest; however, should
every spectrum use which benefits the public interest be given all
the bandwidth it might practically use, it would quickly be discovered that the available frequencies are insufficiently numerous
to prevent a chaotic interference situation. Many private or commercial enterprises of demonstrated value to the public interest
have been denied licenses for lack of spectrum-space to accommo8 It is essential, therefore,
date them."
to weigh the public interest
value of each conflicting spectrum use, as well as its necessity and
convenience.
That the IRAC and the OTP need not base decisions upon
public interest considerations makes it impossible for the FCC to
make frequency allocation decisions in the public interest, in spite
of the fact that FCC decisions are subject to judicial review."'
The problem is not merely that the OTP and the IRAC can appropriate to a relatively unimportant government use a frequency band
which might otherwise be available to a private or commercial
use of greater public value. The greatest potential harm arises from
the fact that bands which are allocated to a given service by the
OTP or the IRAC to facilitate a specific government spectrum
use may often be most efficiently shared with particular private
and commercial interest, including those whose use is the same or
"See,

e.g., Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959),

cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960); Class E. Citizens Radio Service, 41 F.C.C.2d
147, 148, 152-54 (1973).
97 Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).

91Id.; American Bond & Mortgage v. United States, 52 F.2d 318 (7th Cir.
1931).
9"The problem may not exist for frequency assignment decisions since, once
a band has been allocated to use by services of a strictly commercial or private
nature, the FCC need interact no further with the OTP in making assignments
in these bands. However, some bands are allocated to services which include both

government and private or commercial users, and in considering frequency assignments therein, the FCC and the OTP must collaborate.
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similar in character. It must be recognized that the IRAC is composed of agencies which may in fact represent private or commercial interests, or which may merely be required to promote the
welfare of these interests in the proper exercise of their authority.
Therefore, the FCC could be forced to choose between maximizing
efficiency of spectrum use and considerations of public interest
which would otherwise mandate allocating a band to services which
cannot share with the government service in question. If, after the
OTP or the IRAC has allocated a band to a particular service for
government use, the FCC allocates the same band to the same
service for private use, or to one of a limited number of services
which can share the band without interfering with the government
stations, how can the public be assured that all elements of the
public interest, convenience, and necessity have been considered?
We emphasize that the fact that the OTP allocation might be
to a service, the operation of which is undoubtedly in the public
interest, is not the important consideration. What bands and how
much bandwidth are to be allocated for use by private or commercial interests, or for their benefit, was intended by Congress
to be decided solely by the FCC as part of a comprehensive frequency management scheme that considered all elements of the
public interest as well as the public convenience and necessity.
Furthermore, this scheme was to be publicly justified and subject
to judicial review. Under the system which now exists, there is a
lack of public evidence that all elements of public interest, convenience, and necessity have been considered in the development
of the frequency allocation plan that the OTP and th FCC have
worked out between them. Not only is this plan not effectively
subject to judicial review, but there is reason to fear that the interests of some special groups could be unduly favored at the expense
of others.
The obvious conclusion is that the FCC cannot assign frequencies to private and commercial spectrum users according to
the public interest, convenience, or necessity once it is conceded
that it cannot operate independently of the OTP, but must divide
the available spectrum with that agency according to no standard
other than whatever compromise the member agencies of the IRAC
have found it convenient to make. That some weighing of public
interest considerations may in fact take place and that the FCC
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and the OTP appear to have devised a frequency allocation scheme
that does, to at least some degree, appear to serve the public interest are no more than tributes to those career civil servants whose
conscientious labor has made this so. It says nothing in favor of
a law which was supposed to establish a uniform standard for private and commercial spectrum use and provide a means of ensuring
that the application of that standard would be as free as possible
from arbitrariness, caprice, and undue influence by powerful special
interests, but instead has created a system which encourages these
to reign unchecked.
It is remarkable that frequency allocations have not been litigated more frequently. Perhaps the principal case in the area is
Bendix Aviation v. FCC, °° and it provides emphasis for all that
has just been said. At issue there was the FCC response to a decision by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which at that
time exercised the presidential authority to assign frequencies to
government radio stations now delegated to the OTP. That decision was to assign frequencies in the bands 420 to 450 MHz and
8.5 to 9.0 GHz to classified government "radio positioning" operations (military radars). At the request of the ODM, the FCC reallocated these bands to bar, ultimately, all private and commercial use of the frequencies therein. Previously, the bands had been
available to the aeronautical radio-navigation service. Bendix,
which pursuant to the reallocation had been refused a license for
experimental use of an airborne aircraft collision avoidance system at 430 MHz, and parties including several airlines which had
licenses or were committed to seeking licenses for radars at 8.8
GHz challenged the reallocation in two separate actions, which
were consolidated. The decision will be referred to throughout this
article, since it considered issues concerning both the International
Telecommunications Convention and the necessity for the use of
a particular frequency, which will be relevant to our discussion
of problems of the passive services. What is important for present
purposes is that the court recognized that the President had
authority under section 305"' to assign the frequencies in question
to government use and that this decision was not subject to ju100 Bendix

Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. de-

nied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
10147 U.S.C. S 305(a)

(1970).
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dicial review. The FCC on the other hand, was held to have
made a reasonable and neither arbitrary nor capricious decision
with respect to what served the public interest, convenience, or
necessity, when, at the request of the ODM and in the name of
national security, it acted to remove frequency bands which were
to be used by the government from private use. The court proclaimed itself to be well aware of the problem of dual frequency

allocation authority and further noted counsel's arguments concerning its potential for compromising the public interest," ' but

concluded that the problem posed was for Congress to resolve.
Presumably, had the FCC had no substantial evidence upon which

to base its decision that a paramount national security interest
justified its reallocation decision,"2 the court could have reversed

that decision. This would have been a Pyrrhic victory for the
plaintiff, however, for the crucial decision was that of the ODM

to allow military use of these frequencies for "radio positioning,"
and this decision was exempt from judicial review. The radars in
question happen to be among the most powerful transmitters on
this planet, and even had they prevailed against the FCC, the

plaintiffs would have been confronted with a probably intolerable
interference situation about which they could do little.''

The dual authority problem has existed for too long now. It has
been amply discussed in the literature" and much verbiage has
'In 272 F.2d 539-40:
We have fully appreciated the importance of the issue. We do not
question that Bendix is competent and qualified. We recognize the
depth of the conflict between the demands of the Executive on the
one hand and of private but important non-Government entities on
the other. Various possibilities of abuse can be conjured were we to
speculate, but we cannot assume and there is no slightest suggestion
of record, that there has been a perversion of the Commission's administrative processes for an improper purpose.
102The evidence, however, consisted of classified documents which the court
refused to scrutinize, even in camera. Must the FCC abandon to the government
any frequency for any use, no matter how trivial, where the government chooses
to mask the nature of its use behind a security classification?
'0 Had events taken this course, however, they might have sought to require
the government to conform with 47 U.S.C. § 323 and shut down its radars for
the final 45 minutes of every hour. It is an interesting speculation whether a court
decision to this effect would have provoked Congressional action to resolve the
dual authority problem.
102 See, e.g., Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation, supra note 31; Robinson, Radio Spectrum Regulation: The Administrative
Processand the Problems of InstitutionalReform, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1179 (1969).
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been devoted to proposing solutions, such as the selling of frequency-channels at auction, ' which lack merit in varying degrees.
We cannot allocate space to discuss these; it is enough to note
that they provide no remedy for the favoring of powerful or wealthy special interests at the expense of the public good and could
even make such favoritism more likely. Here we advocate an
approach which is simple, readily implemented, and capable of
curing the problem. We can, in fact, live with the dual authority
of the FCC and the OTP if we but eliminate its potential for abuse.
Coordination between these agencies is effective; there is no need
to attempt to establish new agencies or alternate procedures. The
problem with the existing system is not that it does not work, but
that it works without standards intended to govern the operations
of the FCC. Therefore, it seems to us that all that is required is
for Congress (1) to recognize existing practices by incorporating
co-ordination between the FCC and the OTP into the Communications Act, and (2) to establish standards to govern it. Once
this is done, that process will automatically be subject to judicial
review under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act.
We specifically propose that the FCC and the OTP together be
obligated to draw up a single comprehensive frequency allocation
plan and to assign frequencies to government and private or commercial stations in a manner which will avoid interference between
them. In these endeavors they should be required to conform to
the "public interest, convenience, or necessity" standard and to
make every possible effort to achieve efficient and economical use
of the spectrum. We would allow the President unfettered discretion to assign frequencies to government stations only if these frequencies are in a band solely allocated to government use and the
assignment poses no possibility of interference between the government station and a private or commercial station."' The availability
100Note, The Crisis in Electromagnetic Frequency Spectrum Allocation, supra

note 31, at 472-79, nn.202 & 203; Coase, The Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee, 5 J. LAw & EcoN. 17 (1962).
'07As far as the national defense and security are concerned, surely in this
post-Watergate era we can see them in perspective as no more than important

elements of the public interest, save in the event of a real emergency. And we
should not forget that should a crisis arise, 47 U.S.C. S 606 provides the President
with powers to appropriate frequency channels, and these should prove sufficient

to cope with it.
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of judicial review"' will guarantee that the formulation of the frequency management plan will consider all elements of the public
welfare and will be as free as possible from undue influence by
any special interest group.
We believe that all this can be accomplished by repealing section
323 of the Communications Act, which does not recognize the
realities of modem technology, and replacing it by the following:
323 Apportionment of the Spectrum between Government and
Private or Commercial Stations.
All other provisions of this chapter not withstanding:
(a) From time to time, as circumstances require, and subject to
public interest, convenience, and necessity, the President or
his delegate shall, together with the Commission, devise a
comprehensive scheme of frequency management, including
the allocation of bands of frequencies to various classes of
private, commercial, and government radio stations.
(b) Where interference between a government station and a
private or commercial station is potentially a consideration,
public interest, convenience, and necessity shall govern use
of the radio spectrum by the government, including the
assignment of frequencies to government radio stations.
(c) In implementing the terms of this section, both the President and the Commission shall make every effort to ensure
efficient and economical use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum."'
IV.

INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

Having discussed, from a purely domestic standpoint, the nature of the relationship between the FCC and the OTP, we must
now say something about how frequency management by these
agencies is impacted by international spectrum-usage treaties to
which the United States is a party. We have noted that, although the
FCC and the OTP have authority to regulate United States use of the
radio spectrum, it is the State Department which negotiates international telecommunications treaties."' These treaties contain their
108That classified data may have been considered in reaching a decision should
be no impediment to effective judicial review thereof.
1We have attempted to follow in part the wording of 47 U.S.C. S 303, and

47 U.S.C. § 701(b). Our proposal does not require modification of 47 U.S.C. §
303(c) since that section is prefaced by the words, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in this chapter."
"0 See Section I supra.
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own standards for spectrum use and include frequency allocation
schemes. We shall see that although according to a strictly legal
interpretation, the effect of these should be small, as a practical
matter, the influence of the treaties is enormous. Moreover, the
method by which they are negotiated, combined with the way the
courts regard them, provides another mechanism for the promulgation of a spectrum management scheme without a guarantee that
all elements of public interest, convenience, and necessity have
been considered.
International use of the radio-frequency spectrum is governed
primarily by the International Telecommunication Convention..
and the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication
Union.11 Their primary purposes are to facilitate cooperation
among the signatory nations in the utilization of the radio spectrum
and to foster more efficient use of the telecommunications services." ' To this end, great emphasis is placed on the obligation of
national administrations to bar transmissions which cause harmful
interference to the transmissions of other countries. However, the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is not conceived
of as an enforcement body. Rather it seems to have been intended
to provide a framework in which sovereign nations may voluntarily
cooperate to advance their own self-interest by avoiding interfering
with one another's transmissions and receptions, without sacrificing
their control over their own use of the radio spectrum.11 The role
of the ITU in this framework is primarily one of a mediator and
disseminator of information. The ITU can be said to possess enforcement power only to the degree that it can assess non-compliance with the standard established by the Regulations and Convention and notify the international community thereof." '
The Regulations are little more than a compact by the signatory
1 International Telecommunication Convention, 18 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No.
6267 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
112 Radio Regulations, supra note 1. In addition to the Radio Regulations and
the Convention, the United States is party to a plethora of bilateral and multilateral spectrum-usage agreements with a wide variety of countries. See, e.g., 42

Fed. Reg. 27,199, 27,200-206 (1976).
1
Convention, supra note 111, art. 4.
"

4

See Convention, supra note 111, arts. 4, 44; see also, D.

LEIVE, INTER-

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF
THE

RADIO SPECTRUM (1970) [hereinafter cited as LEIvE].
See generally LEIvE, supra note 111.

1
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nations not to interfere with each other's radio transmissions. To
accomplish this goal they include guidelines for radio use and a
means for establishing international priority among potentially conflicting national frequency uses. For example, Articles 9 and 9A
of the Regulations, among other things, establish that the international status of a given national frequency assignment depends
upon: (1) whether it causes harmful interference to other users;
(2) its conformity with all the provisions of the Convention and
Regulations; and (3) the date of its notification to the International
Frequency Registration Board."' Historically, the third of these
was of the first importance," ' and priority in time may still support
a claim of priority in right even where some other basis can be
found for distinguishing between two conflicting uses. It is probably correct, however, to assert that today the primary claim to
priority that can be made for an assignment is its conformity with
the various technical guidelines contained in the Regulations.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a
detailed discussion of the Regulations, we will briefly outline the
nature of these guidelines. They can be separated into three categories. The first consists of detailed technical requirements such as
standards for power levels, spurious radiation, and antennas for
various services,"' as well as administrative provisions'. and operational procedures; 1' these are the concern of the bulk of the regulations. In the second category are found the procedures by which
the various national administrations are to interact with the ITU
and its permanent organs, such as the International Frequency
Registration Board (IFRB), as well as with one another."' About
these two categories this article will say little more, however, the
third is of some importance to it. This is the Table of Frequency
Allocations," the purpose of which is to divide the useable spectrum into bands assigned to services which have international
priority.
116Radio Regulations, supra note 1, arts. 9, 9A.
117

Id. at 48-62.

"I

See, e.g., Radio Regulations, supra note 1, art. 7.

"" See, e.g., id. arts. 17-21.

e.g., id. arts. 22-40.
See, e.g., id. arts. 8, 9, 9A.
2
1 2 Id. art. 5.
120 See,

"'
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The method of the Table is to divide the world into three geographical regions,"n each with its own allocation scheme.' A particular frequency band in a given region may be allocated to one
service on a primary basis, to another on a permitted basis, and
to a third on a secondary basis."n Permitted and primary services
have equal rights, except that in the preparation of frequency plans
administrations are supposed to give first choice of frequencies to
primary services."" Secondary services are recognized as having
priority of use in a frequency band provided only that they do not
interfere with stations of the primary or permitted services to

which that band is allocated, though the latter's use came later in
time. Furthermore, secondary services cannot claim protection
from harmful interference by stations of a primary or permitted
service. ' Finally, individual nations are permitted to except themselves from this scheme by attaching a footnote to the Table under
the band in question; the degree of international priority to be
accorded to services with footnote authority to transmit is indicated by the footnote in question."'
The Table of Frequency Allocations is not intended as an enforceable prohibition of non-conforming uses in the various defined bands. Rather, it is intended to give enhanced legal status
to certain radio-spectrum users, while denying it to others. The
precise legal status so conferred is subject to the interpretation of
any concerned administration,"' and it seems that the signatories
to the Convention intended no more than to commit themselves
to consider their good faith interpretation of legal status in making
frequency assignments. This commitment is far from trivial, how"id. art. 5 5 125-132.
4

It is interesting to note that this method of allocation may not remain
viable in the space age. For example, a particular frequency band could be allocated to the fixed service in Region 1 (Europe and the U.S.S.R.), but to a space
service in Region 2 (Western Hemisphere). Does this mean that a space station,
on say, one of the moons of Jupiter would be entitled to transmit in this band
if operated by the United States, but not if operated by the U.S.S.R.? If both
countries were operating stations in the Jovian system and wished to talk to each
other, would they be obligated each to transmit on one frequency and receive
on another?
"' Radio Regulations, supra note 1, art. 5 § 137.
"Id. art. 5 5 138.
1"7Id. art. 5 5 139.
"-Id.art. 5 55 140-148.
12 See LEIVE, supra note 114, at 128-81 and discussion, this Section infra.
12
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ever, for administrations have a powerful self-interest in international cooperation so as to avoid large-scale harmful interference
with each other's radio communications. The legal standing conferred on an assignment by the Regulations, therefore, is of no
small importance. All relevant facts to its determination are recorded by the IFRB in its Master International Frequency Register.
Section 486 (and, with respect to satellite systems, section
639AA) of the Regulations provide that any frequency assignment
is to be notified to the IRFB if:
(a) the use of the frequency concerned is capable of causing harmful interference to any service of an administration; or
(b) the frequency is to be used for international radio-communication; or
(c) it is desired to obtain international recognition of the use of the
frequency.'10

Thus failure to make notification of a frequency use either theoretically capable of causing harmful interference or for the purpose
of international radio-communication deprives it of all legal standing (but does not make it illegal), even though it is assigned to
the primary service indicated by the Table. On the other hand, the
legal status accorded by "international recognition" is not defined, but there seems to be an intent to create some standing,
however small, for any use which an administration notifies to
the IFRB. The only use clearly intended to be proscribed is one
which actually causes harmful interference within some other
country with a use with greater right to the frequency in question. '
It is entirely clear from the wording of Article 3 (sections 113117) of the Regulations that the sole purpose of the Table is to
establish a set of priorities which will enable the resolution of
international interference disputes by the efforts of the parties
concerned, and not to mandate a scheme which the ITU members
are bound to follow in devising their own national frequency allocations. Indeed, to give this point its proper emphasis, it is necessary
only to quote in full sections 113 and 115 of the Regulations, and
the first paragraph of the preamble to the Convention:
Section 113

The Members and Associate Members of the Union agree that
Regulations, supra note 1, art. 9 § 486.
See id. art. 3 S§ 113-15. See discussion, this Section inf ra.

US°Radio

"'
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in assigning frequencies to stations which are capable of causing
harmful interference to the services rendered by the stations of
another country, such assignments are to be made in accordance
with the Table of Frequency Allocations and other provisions of
these Regulations.
Section 115
Administrations of the Members and Associate Members of the
Union shall not assign to a station any frequency in derogation of
either the Table of Frequency Allocations given in this Chapter or
the other provisions of these Regulations, except on the express
condition that harmful interference shall not be caused to services
carried on by stations operating in accordance with the provisions
of the Convention and of these Regulations.
Preamble to the Convention
While fully recognizing the sovereign right of each country to
regulate its telecommunications, the plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Governments, with the object of facilitating relations and
co-operation between the peoples by means of efficient telecommunications services, have agreed to conclude the following Convention.1"
We conclude that the Table's allocations scheme simply need not
be followed where frequency assignments do not result in interference to spectrum use in accordance with it by other countries,.
132 Radio Regulations, supra note 1, art. 3 §S 113, 115; Convention, supra note
111, Preamble (emphasis added).
133The lengths to which the Convention and Regulations go to emphasize that
they purport to create neither a mandatory allocations scheme nor a mechanism
to enforce such a scheme are remarkable. The preamble to the Convention "fully"
recognizes "the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunications." Article 50, §§ 165 & 166, of the Convention discusses settlement of disputes, including those concerned with which country has priority to a given frequency channel when mutual interference occurs. No mandatory international
adjudicatory procedure is established, but settlement may be "through diplomatic
channels or according to procedures established by bilateral or multilateral
treaties .... or by any other method mutually agreed upon;" however, section 166
provides that disputes may also be subjected to arbitration. Administrations are
allowed to negotiate footnote exceptions to the Table of Frequency Allocations
and to notify the IFRB and have recorded in the Master Register assignments
which are not in conformity with that Table. See note 128 supra. They are also
entitled to have officially noted, as part of the Final Protocol to the Acts of a
World Administrative Radio Conference, statements of policy which may indicate an intent to allocate the spectrum in a manner not consistent with the Table.
See, e.g., Statement of India concerning 845-935 MHz band, Final Acts of the
WARC for Space Telecommunications, April 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S.
No. 7435.
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For a large and geographically isolated country like the United

States, this could provide broad leeway.1"'
Since, in the United States, the Convention and Regulations
are accorded the status of a multilateral treaty ratified by the Sen-

ate, they are domestic law. Whether this law confers substantive
rights on spectrum users beyond those established by the Com-

munications Act or in derogation of its provisions is questionable.
The Treaty has occasionally been pleaded by litigants in spectrum
disputes, but with little success. Indeed, in Bendix Aviation the
court in effect held that as far as the rights of parties and commercial spectrum users are concerned, the Treaty is a nullity un-

less some issue of international interference is involved." This
attitude appears to be common to other decisions as well. For
example, WREC v. Federal Radio Commission" involved an

appeal from a Federal Radio Commission decision which allowed
another station, WMT, to increase its transmitter power from 250
watts to 500 watts. WREC feared that this would result in interference to its own broadcasts and argued, among other things, that

the grant of increased power was in violation of broadcasting
agreements between the United States and Canada. The court,
however, held that this point was "unimportant because of the

fact that such a condition if it existed would not affect the rights
13

4We note that since allocations to the passive services result in no transmissions, there is no possibility of harmful interference therefrom. Therefore, it
would not violate the Radio Regulations to allocate any frequency band to a
passive service, although such allocation did not have the sanction of the Table.
Where an allocaton in conformity with the Table is contested by a passive service, the FCC should be expected to be able to make a showing of public interest,
convenience, or necessity in support of that allocation other than our international
obligations, which would not be at issue.
The Bendix court explained:
We need not stop to explore the full import of Article 22 of the
International Telecommunications Convention, Buenos Aires, 1952,
the preamble of which fully recognized "the sovereign right of each
country to regulate its telecommunication." . . . Bendix can take
nothing from the treaty which represents the agreement of our Government. Action, if and when taken pursuant to the Convention in
behalf of our Government, must be by the President as Chief Executive, and we fail to see how in any respect his action here is contrary to our international obligations. Our review authority extends
only to decisions and orders of the Commission.
Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 965 (1960).
1 67 F.2d 578 (D.C.Cir. 1933).
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or interests of WREC...... Moreover, in United States v. Mclntire,I
a claim by defendant that it needed no license from the FCC to
broadcast from an off-shore station, by virtue of the International
Telecommunications Convention was rejected. On the other hand,
it appears that the Convention, Regulations, and other international agreements can supply the principal justification for FCC
rules and actions,'3 especially those which deny to license-applicants the right to broadcast."'
It would seem, therefore, a fair conclusion that treaties, as domestic law, compel neither the FCC nor the OTP to act in any
particular way with respect to frequency allocation. As domestic
law, however, they can be used by these agencies to provide an
essentially invulnerable defense for any allocation decision which
appears to conform to them. At least where the possibility of interference with radio communication of other countries exists,'' the
FCC seems entitled to adopt the allocations scheme set forth in
the Table of Frequency Allocations of the ITU Radio Regulations.
It seems indisputable that the public interest, which is required
by the Communications Act to govern frequency allocations,'"
should first of all be determined by other laws where they are
applicable. To the extent that the international telecommunications
agrements obligate the United States, it is difficult to argue that
the FCC must make any showing of public interest greater than
the existence of that obligation to support a frequency allocation
or other decision in conformity with those agreements. Courts have
not held otherwise.'
If our interpretation of the operative effect of the international
treaties is correct,'" it creates a potentially undesirable situation.
137Id.

at 579.

138 365 F. Supp. 618 (D.N.J. 1973)

(motion to dismiss temporary restraining

order denied), 370 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.J. 1974) (permanent injunction granted).
"See WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 914 (1968).
''United States v. McIntire, 365 F. Supp. 618 (D.N.J. 1973).
14'At some level this possibility always exists, provided only that some trans-

mission of a radio signal takes place. See Section II supra.
47 U.S.C. S 303(c) (1970).
143See cases cited at notes 135, 136, 138 and 139 supra.
'There

is lttle judicial

authority on the matter. Spectrum

management

treaties do not appear to have been frequently argued in litigation, and the
concern we now consider apparently has never been raised at all.
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Our concern arises because, once again, we see a mechanism by
which it appears possible to avoid the public policy, originally
established by the Radio Act of 1927, that no overall spectrum
management scheme be promulgated without consideration of all
elements of public interest, convenience, and necessity, or with
favoritism toward any wealthy or powerful special interest group
at the expense of the public good."1 The point never appears to
have been raised, either in court or before Congress, that treaty
provisions may have been intended primarily for the benefit of
individual American spectrum users, or particular classes of American spectrum users, and, therefore, should not be available to
justify allocation of frequency bands to these users. This possibility is, in fact, expected to be reality, however, because the United
States is the world's largest and most powerful spectrum user, and,
historically, it has exerted great influence upon the final form of
the Radio Regulations, including the Table of Frequency Allocations. ' " The Table is revised every few years at World Administrative Radio Conferences; both the FCC and the OTP work years
in advance to prepare United States positions for these conferences." In developing these positions, the FCC is required to
consider the public interest, convenience, or necessity, but the
OTP is not. ' " The final position of the United States for such a
conference is prepared in formal, documentary form by the Department of State, according to the inputs it receives from these
two agencies." ' The State Department also is not constrained to
act in accord with that public interest, convenience, or necessity
contemplated by the Communications Act and Communications
141 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169 §§
1, 9, 44 Stat. 1162. See H.R. REP. No.
1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 16-18 (1927).

146 See LEIVE, supra note 114, at 40-80, 109-14, 224-25; compare also, the proposed changes to the Radio Regulatons in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PROPOSALS OF
THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA FOR THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE

RADIO CON-

FERENCE FOR SPACE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, GENEVA 1971 (Dec. 1970) [hereinafter cited as UNITED STATES PROPPOSALS FOR THE 1971 SPACE WARC] with the

changes actually made in the Regulations at that conference. Radio Regulations,
supra noe 1.
1470
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ED STATES USE AND MANAGEMENT at

POLICY,

THE RADIO

B-5, 6, C-9 (Aug. 1975).

SPECTRUM-UNIT-

11 Id. at B-5. The practice of the FCC is to hold public hearings on proposed
treaty
modifications.
149
See, e.g., UNITED STATES PROPOSAl. FOR THE 1971 SPACE WARC, supra
note 146.
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Satellite Act. 1° It is entirely possible, therefore, that a recommendation of the OTP or the FCC will eventually become a provision of the Radio Regulations, and that subsequently that provision will be used by the FCC as the sole justification for a specific

regulation of private or commercial radio spectrum use. 1 In such
a situation existing judicial precedents would lead a court to uphold the FCC action, but there would actually have been no con-

sideration by it of public interest, convenience, or necessity."'
This is a difficult problem. Congress cannot control the power
of the State Department to negotiate provisions of treaties, and it
would probably not be desirable to limit the power of the FCC to
make regulations based on the provisions of these treaties. The
best remedy we can propose is judicial vigilance. We suggest that
courts adopt the attitude that the Radio Regulations or Table of

Frequency Allocations may be deemed to have been made for
the benefit of United States spectrum users, to the degree that
they have adopted the United States negotiating position. Where
the motivating force behind the adoption of a treaty provision was

an American requirement, that provision should be given no weight
in a determination by the FCC of public interest, convenience, or
necessity with respect to a private or commercial spectrum user.'
Where no showing of public interest, convenience, or necessity,
150 The power of the Executive to negotiate spectrum-management treaties is
established by U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and any attempt by Congress to
mandate standards for such negotiation would be void. Nothing in the Communications Act or in the Communications Satellite Act purports to bind the
State Department to negotiate according to public interest, convenience, or necessity.
"'Something very similar to this was in fact what happened in Bendix Aviation v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
"I There might well be no government interest at stake, and the situation
here might arise even in the absence of the conflict of authority between the OTP
and the FCC. The FCC might propose a treaty provision to the State Department under circumstances where, if it had instead attempted to enforce the contents of that provision as a purely domestic regulation, a court would strike it
down. But it is difficult to imagine a private or commercial interest that would
potentially be wronged by the provision even trying to prevent the FCC from
making a recommendation to the State Department. Once the recommendation
has been accepted by the State Department and incorporated in the treaty, the
injured party would be out of luck.
" Especially should this be true where the purported treaty obligation is
merely a footnote, see note 128 supra, whereby the United States has chosen
to except itself from the general international regulatory scheme for the benefit
of some domestic interest.
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other than such a treaty provision, has been made by the FCC,
courts should not enforce disputed FCC regulations. Courts should
carefully scrutinize frequency allocations and other FCC decisions,
purportedly required by our treaty commitments, to ensure that a
bona fide international obligation is at issue.
We emphasize our principal conclusions with respect to the
effect of international agreements. The case law seems strongly to
support the proposition that should the FCC allocate some frequency band in a manner at variance with treaty provisions it would
not be possible for a private or commercial party disadvantaged by
this decision to persuade a court to reverse it on the basis of the
treaty alone. Instead, the challenger would have to allege that
the allocation was contrary to public interest, convenience, or
necessity, or was otherwise in conflict with non-treaty law. The
treaty is a one-way street. It can be used by the FCC to support
its decisions; it provides no basis upon which private or commercial interests can mount challenges thereto. Therefore, courts
should be alert to the possibility that where a treaty provision is
argued in support of an FCC decision that provision was actually
agreed to at the instigation of the United States. Where this is
true, the court should look behind the treaty provision to the
domestic interest concerned, and satisfy itself that full consideration
of all elements of public interest, convenience, and necessity would
give a result no different from that which follows from application
of the treaty.
V. ALLOCATIONS TO THE PASSIVE SERVICES

The major purpose of this article is to discuss frequency allocation with respect to passive scientific research. To do this properly,
however, we have found it necessary to discuss in some detail the
role played in the frequency allocation process by the FCC, the
OTP, and State Department. This is because these agencies have
conflicting authority, and this creates possibilities for arbitrary or
capricious decisions which can thwart the congressional policy'
that private and commercial spectrum use be governed by public
"This

congressional policy is expressed in the Communications Act of 1934,

47 U.S.C. §§ 151-606 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally the Radio Act of 1927,

ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, and in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47
U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1970).
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interest, convenience, or necessity. The potential consequences of
this are especially serious for the passive services.
We contend that the Communications Act and Communications
Satellite Act should be understood to mandate that specific factors
in favor of frequency allocations to passive services must be considered. This argument is founded primarily upon our interpretation, supported by judicial precedent and principles of statutory
construction, of the meaning of "public interest, convenience, or
necessity," the standard imposed by those Acts. To the degree that
it is presently possible, as a result of multiple agency authority,
to make frequency allocations in derogation of that standard, the
rights of the passive services may be denied. Although this is true
for other services, it is a matter especially serious for the passive
services, because they do not represent profit-making enterprises.
Unfortunately, in modem society it seems to require money to
defend jeopardized rights, and, unlike the giants of the telecommunications industry, the passive services are poor. Just as their
product, knowledge, benefits primarily society, so must they rely
on society for the defense of their rights. The conflict of authority
among federal agencies with spectrum management powers is a
threat to the ability of the passive services to conduct scientific
research of great social value. Congress and the courts should take
care to see that this threat is ended.
Our interpretation of public interest, convenience, and necessity
with respect to the passive services rests upon three pillars: (1) that
the special character of scientific research raises an issue of public
necessity that has been absent in most disputes over spectrum use;
(2) that scientific research is a national concern which extends far
beyond mere regulation of telecommunications, and that in determining the public interest, federal science policy cannot be
ignored; and (3) with respect to the passive services only, frequency
allocation standards which bind the OTP, as well as the FCC,
may exist as a consequence of legislation outside the telecommunications area. If we are correct in the latter, these standards may
provide a round-about solution for at least part of the multipleauthority problems, but only with respect to the passive services.
The direct resolutions that we have proposed are to be preferred.
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A. Judicial Interpretation of Public Interest, Convenience, or Necessity
As is true of other utilities, entry in the communications field is
conditioned on a finding that obtaining the service is in the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity." At least in telecommunications
litigation, courts typically treat all three terms as though they were
one word, with a meaning very close to "public interest" standing
by itself.1" Since the terms are disjunctive, however, we believe that
a conflict among the elements should be resolved by the FCC by
weighing one against the other." ' For example, if use of a particular frequency is necessary to one service, but not to another, the
former might have priority with respect to it, even though the latter's use were thought to be somewhat more in the public interest.
Consideration of factors of public necessity differentiable from public interest is mandatory since failure of the FCC to weigh all relevant factors is per se arbitrary and capricious and therefore grounds
for reversal. "'" There appears to be no directly applicable authority
relating to frequency allocation, however, since most litigated FCC
decisions involve radio and television broadcast station licensing.
Licensing disputes generally turn upon issues of public interest only.
They seldom are framed in terms of convenience or necessity. We
feel that allocations to the passive services involve considerations
of both public interest and necessity. Therefore, we discuss both
separately.
1. The Public Interest
Since, under the Communications Act, the same standard which
governs frequency licensing also governs frequency allocations,"'
we turn to the many decisions which concern the former for guid1w Comprehensive research has uncovered only a few instances in which

"interest," "necessity," or "convenience" appear to have been understood as possibly conveying separate meanings; these are discussed infra.
" The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. S 309(a) (1970), and the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. 55 721(c)(7), (9) (1970),
mandate a standard of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" (emphasis

added) for certain decisions. Where this is the standard, we would argue that all
its elements must be present before the activity in question is justifiable. The frequency allocations standard is specifically "public interest, convenience, or necessity" (emphasis added), 47 U.S.C. S 303(c) (1970).
"SAdministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1970), as interpreted in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
158 47 U.S.C. 5 303 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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ance as to what are the elements of public interest. In the first place,
what constitutes the public interest in a given situation depends
upon the circumstances. The public interest is "to be interpreted
by its context, by the nature of radio transmission and reception,

by the scope, character, and quality of services.''. Determination
of the public interest is not necessarily a question of fact, however.
The FCC has a duty to consider any and all technical factors which

may be relevant. It must also interpret the Communications and
Communications Satellite Acts and make policy determinations.
Factual questions within the special competence of the Commission
are only subject to redetermination by reviewing courts when there

is no substantive foundation for them in the record."' The FCC's
determination of the public interest may encompass both matters

purely factual and questions of law."'1 It is important to understand
that this distinction exists-that the public interest may encompass
both matters purely factual and questions of law-in order to understand the case law. It appears that courts have seldom been per-

suaded to correct alleged factual errors in FCC determinations of
public interest since fact questions involve the Commission's special
competence.

'

Courts, however, have never been reluctant to re-

verse the FCC because it has incorrectly either applied the law or
determined policy."
139
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 285 (1933). Accord, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S.60190, 216 (1943).
1 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 145 (1940).
161Id.
1'2"Substantial evidence," however, must support the FCC's findings. Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 613 (1938); Western Union Div. v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 324,
332-33
(D.D.C.), afl'd, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
16 3 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1953). Many
specific questions which come before the FCC partake of both law and fact
determination. For example, it has been held that among the elements included
in the public interest is the community's need for a service. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Colonial Broadcasters v. FCC,
105 F.2d 781, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1939); see text infra. This is a binding principle
of law; therefore where a community need exists, the FCC must give weight to
this need in evaluating an application for a frequency license, or in any other
decision that requires consideration of the public interest. But, whether or not a
community need exists at all, given the circumstances of a particular case, is a
question of fact. In general, whether or not a certain factor constitutes an element of the public interest is a matter of law, but its application to specific circumstances is a question of fact.
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The cases define at least three areas of inquiry which, if appro-

priate to the circumstances, may be relevant to a determination of
the public interest. These are: (1) whether there is conformity with
the terms and purposes of the Communications Act and, if relevant,
the Communications Satellite Act; (2) whether there are telecommunications policy considerations which flow from the use of the
word "public" to delineate those interests which are paramount;
and 3) whether there are broader considerations of public policy,
the scope of which extends far beyond mere telecommunications
law.
With respect to the first of these areas of inquiry, the FCC must
evaluate the facts before it in accordance with any relevant statutory provisions. It must determine whether harmful interference to
other spectrum users is threatened. ' " It should examine the technical competence of a prospective licensee and decide whether
such technical characteristics as signal strength and antenna design
are sufficient to enable it to provide that service required.'" The
Commission is not limited to making technical calculations. It must
satisfy itself that there will be full compliance with communications
law and its own regulations."'6 It may, for example, deny a license
where the prospective licensee is not a United States citizen, according to sections 303(1) (1) and 303(1) (2) of the Communications Act." ' Finally, observance of technical formalities mandated
by the Act is not in itself enough; the purpose of the Act must also
be considered. It is a policy of the Act, for example, to make the
radio spectrum a public resource not subject to private ownership
rights. Hence, a license must be denied to one whose purpose is to
sell it for profit rather than to use it to provide a needed public
service."'
As far as we have gone, the FCC need do little more than read
the Communications Act and check for compliance with its terms.
When we come to the other two areas of inquiry which are relevant
1"National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 362 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Colonial
Broadcasters v. FCC, 105 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
1

' See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Louisiana Television
Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 347 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
16 Colonial Broadcasters v. FCC, 105 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

I71d.
Crowder v. FCC, 399 F.2d 569 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
(1968); Follways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 375 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
16'

962
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to the public interest, however, we tread on less certain grounds.
With respect to the first of these, considerations of telecommunications policy which are derived from the term "public interest," but
are not mandated by specific provisions of the Communications
Act, it has been held that the public interest is the interest of the
'
"listening public in the larger and more effective use of radio." '
Therefore, the FCC must weigh any benefit to the public against
any loss the public suffers, 7 ' and it must ensure that needed services
are provided to the community."' The public interest, however, has
not been interpreted to mean that which brings the greatest good
to the greatest number. Wherever possible, minority interests must
be protected and considered as part of the public interest, provided
only that spectrum space be available.' Where even a small fraction of a community has an interest not shared by the rest, that
must be accommodated, even though catering to the majority interest might be more profitable. It has been held that the public
interest requires diversity of broadcast format,'' as well as diversity of approach and viewpoint with respect to editorials, reportorial assignments, and news coverage;'.' that the Commission must
consider and attempt to meet the needs of educational television,
as well as those of commercial interests;'7 that geographical minorities or other portions of the public may not be deprived of
'°

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943),

citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
""Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1952).

"'National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943);
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Robinson v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964); Democratic Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Colonial Broadcasters v. FCC,

105 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
' 2 H&B Communication Corp. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
'73 Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (buyers of radio
station were not allowed to abandon classical music format even though surveys
established that only 16% of listening public preferred classical music, and that
more advertising revenue could be received by converting to a popular music
format).
174 Lakewood Broadcasting Serv. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1973);

Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
' Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
'0

Pennsylvania State Univ. v. FCC, 304 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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service;." and that diversity of ownership is important to the public interest."" Where the interests of two special groups conflict, the

FCC must weigh the possible gain of one against the possible loss
of the other."
The public interest is seen as something distinct from economic
interests of spectrum users. A license to use publicly owned resources imposes obligations which could require the licensee to
make financial sacrifice.'8° Economic injury to the licensee is in and
of itself not an element of the public interest which the FCC must
weigh.'' An old line of cases held that, in license renewals, valuable
rights and investments made in reliance on a license of the FCC
should not be destroyed except for compelling reasons; however,
these cases are no longer followed. Where there is competition for
a license, no presumption in favor of an applicant for renewal exists. Whether his application will serve the public interest is to be
determined without regard for his potential financial loss.'"' Only
where economic injury to a spectrum user spells destruction or diminution of service to the public does it become an element of the
public interest.'"
Finally, it is clear that the public interest is identical with public
policy in its broadest sense, and that FCC decisions must accord
with national policies which go far beyond mere telecommunications law, provided only that such policies do not directly conflict
with those of the Communications Act itself." Public policy may
"' West Mich. Telecasters v. FCC, 460 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Community Broadcasting v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hall v. FCC, 237
F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
171 Community Broadcasting v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"7' H & B Communications Corp. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
'" Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"' FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
"' Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Evangelical
Lutheran Synod v. FCC, 105 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Journal Co. v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 48 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
183 Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
"' Carroll Broadcasting v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
' McClean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1944):

To secure the continuous, close and informed supervision which
enforcement of legislative mandates frequently requires, Congress
has vested expert administrative bodies such as the Interstate Corn-
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be found in the mandate of the Constitution, established by legislative acts, or supported by judicial doctrines, including traditional
principles of equity. '
2. Necessity
The meaning of necessity in "public interest, convenience, or
merce Commission with broad discretion and has charged them with
the duty to execute stated and specific statutory policies. That delegation does not necessarily include either the duty or the authority
to execute numerous other laws. . . . [Transportation] legislation
constitutes the immediate frame of reference within which the Commission operates; and the policies expressed in it must be the basic
determinator of its action.
But in executing these policies the Commission may be faced with
overlapping and at times inconsistent policies embodied in other
legislation enacted at different times and with different problems in
view. When this is true, it cannot without more ignore the latter.
The precise adjustments which it must make, however, will vary
from instance to instance depending on the extent to which Congress indicates a desire to have these policies leavened or implemented in the enforcement of the various specific provisions of the
legislation with which the Commission is primarily and directly concerned.
It has been held that the FCC must consider a licensee's conduct with respect
to racial discrimination. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). It has also been held that an applicant for
a frequency license must be law abiding, and that the FCC may refuse to issue
a license to one whose broadcasts violate criminal laws. American Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 347
U.S. 284 (1954). The FCC must consider and implement Congressional policies
which favor competition, as well as those which restrict it. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864
(D.C. Cir. 1961); Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Finally, it has been held that the public interest standard necessarily invites reference
to first amendment principles. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The implication is clear that the FCC must
not only avoid violating the Constitution; it must actively seek to further its policy
goals.
186 See cases at note 185 supra with respect to judicial policies. It has been
held that the conduct of the FCC must be governed by traditional principles of
equity, and that, therefore, all viewpoints brought to the attention of the Commission must be treated equally. Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739, 742 (D.C. Cir.
1958). The interests of one spectrum user cannot be treated differently from those
of any other, unless the FCC can show the existence of other public interest factors which are compelling. American Broadcasting Co.-Paramount Theaters, Inc.
v. FCC, 345 F.2d 954, 960, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 906
(1966); American Broadcasting Co.-Paramount Theaters, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.2d
631, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Conformity with procedural requirement also has
been recognized as an element of the public interest. Spanish Int'l Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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necessity" has not often been discussed in judicial telecommunications decisions. Apparently the issue has not been raised; certainly
there is no authority for the proposition that the meaning of
"necessity" is the same as "public interest.' '.. Since most of the
litigated telecommunications disputes involve the award of frequency licenses to radio and television broadcasters, or other
regulation of them, it is not really surprising that the necessity
issue has not been central to the controversy. The problem of
necessity is likely to arise only where users belong~ing to entirely
different services compete for the same frequency, i.e., as a result
of the frequency allocation process. Then, at least one can ask
whether the frequency in question is more necessary to one than
it is to the other and, if so, how that fact limits the FCC's power
to allocate frequencies."'
It has been long established that the meaning of standards such
as "public interest" and "public necessity" depends on the purpose
of the legislation that establishes them, the requirements that legislation imposes, and the context of the provision in question."' To
determine the import of "necessity", therefore, we should first consider the overall policy goals of the Communications Act. Perhaps
chief among these are ensuring efficient spectrum use, which means
maximizing spectrum use while minimizing interference among
different users, and guaranteeing that spectrum use be primarily
for the purpose of public service. A requirement of "necessity" is
consistent with these goals if it means that a particular service of
value to the public will be preferred in the allocation of a given
1"7 There is some authority outside the communications area that
these terms
indeed mean different things. See, e.g., ICC v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 315
U.S. 373, 376-78 (1942); Pan Am.-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905,
909 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965); Florida-Tx. Freight, Inc. v.
United States, 373 F. Supp. 479, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1973), afl'd, 416 U.S. 976 (1974).
"ss "Convenience," too, perhaps ought to be distinguished from "interest" and
"necessity." Public convenience, however, does not appear to us to be relevant
as a separate consideration with respect to frequency allocation, although it may
arise as an issue elsewhere in the telecommunications area. Licensing and allocations problems in telecommunications are above all governed by the natural
scarcity of available frequencies. Issues that could be phrased as conveniences in
areas such as transportation, where entry is less limited, probably become issues
of necessity here.
"'9Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage, 289 U.S. 266
(1933) (interpreting the standard in the Radio Act of 1927); New York Cent.
Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) (interpreting the standard established by the Transportation Act of 1920).
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frequency band where its operation would be less feasible in other
frequency bands. For example, at frequencies above 1 MHz, the
Earth's ionosphere becomes increasingly less reflective. Ordinary
commercial radio broadcasting operates by reflecting signals off
the ionosphere to home receivers over the horizon from the trans-

mitter. Obviously it would not contribute to the maximization of
spectrum use to allocate frequencies around 1GHz, where the
ionosphere is entirely transparent to commercial radio broadcasting, while allocating frequencies below 1 MiHz to some service
which could operate equally well at 1 GHz. Necessity is thus a
question of degree and will be great for a service that can operate
only in severely restricted frequency bands. Since the real question
is efficiency of spectrum usage, to the extent that an individual

spectrum user provides a public service, any necessity peculiar to
it can also be said to be a public necessity.'90
A careful survey of the telecommunications case law reveals
that necessity has, in fact, been an issue in at least one case in1
volving frequency allocation, Bendix Aviation Corp v. FCC. '
There the issue was whether developers and users of an airborne
190 Although telecommunications do not appear to have come to its attention
in this respect, the Supreme Court long ago recognized that when a national interest or policy is at stake, private necessity becomes public necessity. For example, the policy that the nation must have an adequate transportation system
was invoked to support its holding that the need of railroads for funds "not only
for improvement and expansion of facilities, but for adequate maintenance" is
proper grounds for issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, permitting abandonment of an unprofitable
line. Akron, C&Y Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 184, 190 (1923); accord,
Transit Comm'n of N.Y. v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 (1932); Colorado v.
United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926); Indian Valley Ry. v. United States, 52 F.2d
485 (N.D. Ca. 1931), afl'd, 292 U.S. 608 (1934).
In ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1942),
the Court held:
The phrase "public convenience and necessity" no less than the
phrase "public interest" must be given a scope consistent with the
broad purpose of the Transportation Act of 1920: to provide the
public with an efficient and nationally integrated railroad system.
. . . [There is a] national interest in [both the] financial stability
[of railroads and] in the stability of the labor supply available to
the railroads .

...

...There is nothing in the Act to prevent the Commission from
taking action in furtherance of the "public convenience and necessity" merely because the total impact of that action will include
benefits to private persons, either carriers or employees.
19 Bendix Aviation Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 965 (1960).
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aircraft collision avoidance system and air navigation devices
should have priority, with respect to the 420-450 MHz and 8.5-9.0
GHz bands, over government radio-location operations (military
radars). The court accepted the FCC's conclusion that "thesebands
were the only ones in which the government operations were
feasible, while other bands, particularly around 13 GHz, could
feasibly be used by the air navigation services. This conclusion was
a major factor influencing the court's decision in favor of the
government.
B. The Public Interest and Necessity Applied to the Passive Services
We must now consider the need of the passive services for allocated frequency bands, both with respect to the width of these
bands and their location in the frequency spectrum. We believe
that public interest and necessity require that, with respect to
certain frequency allocations, the passive services are to be preferred over other services at least when the active services can be
accommodated at other frequencies. The frequency band requirement for the passive services is a matter of necessity, mandated by
laws of physics over which man has no control. These strictly limit
the freedom of the passive services to operate anywhere in the spectrum. Furthermore, this necessity is not like the private necessity
of a broadcaster wishing to be the one to serve a given region."1
It is like the public necessity of governmental use, since when a
passive service is granted an allocation, use of the band is available to the entire population. Public interest considerations include
the existence of a public policy in favor of the conduct of scientific
investigations for the public benefit which finds expression in
judicial decisions and in numerous enactments of the Congress.
That the passive services must be treated at least on an equal
basis with all other services follows from the fact that they represent an interest of part of the community. When spectrum space
is allocated, this interest cannot be neglected any more than the
interests of lovers of classical music, " CATV subscribers,1" or
192 Such private necessity would be public necessity, however, where a national

interest or public policy is at stake; see note 190 supra. We argue, infra, that a

national interest is indeed at stake when allocations to the passive services are
sought. This is the national interest in promoting scientific research.
See Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"See H&B Communications Corp. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

"
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educational television broadcasters and users. 9 ' Absent compelling
public interest reasons,"6 the passive services may not be treated
inequitably or made to suffer by virtue of a bias toward any other
telecommunications service.19' This is just a beginning. The combination of other elements of the public interest and necessity in
passive use of the radio spectrum to gain scientific knowledge for
the benefit of all is unique to the passive services and creates a
rationale sufficiently compelling to justify some preference with
respect to frequency allocations for these services.
The requirement of necessity is especially important with respect
to the passive services. Many, though not all, kinds of scientific
observation can be performed only at very specific frequencies because of the operation of basic laws of nature. For example, one
of the primary goals of radio astronomy is the study of strong
atomic and molecular spectral line-radiations, which are always
emitted at the same frequency."' The most important lines number
about two dozen, and their study is crucial to our eventual determination of the structure and evolution of our galaxy, the nature
of quasars and exploding galaxies, and a host of other matters."'9
It is simply not possible to make the desired scientific studies at
frequencies other than these line-frequencies. This is as extreme
an example of necessity as might be imagined; either allocations
of particular and narrow frequency bands must be made to the
passive services, or a large class of important scientific studies will
be impossible. Whatever allocations may be made to the passive
services for other reasons, no band can serve as a substitute for a
band which contains an atomic or molecular spectral line.
'
See Pennsylvania State Univ. v. FCC, 304 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
19 American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 954
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 906 (1966).
197 Id. See Noe v. FCC, 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 924 (1959).
19'The frequency of a spectral line is determined by the energy-level structure
of the atom or molecule in question. Only an atom or molecule at rest with respect to an observer will emit radiation precisely at this frequency, however,
particles moving with respect to an observer will emit at frequencies shifted from
the basic frequency by the fraction L v/c of that frequency where ±L v is the
velocity of the particle toward or away from the observer and c is the speed of
light. For typical radio lines this fraction is less than 1%.
'99 NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON RADIO FREQUENCIES,
VIEWS CONCERNING FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS FOR THE RADIO ASTRONOMY SERV-

ICE IN PREPARATION FOR THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIvE RADIO CONFERENCE-1979
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The situation is similar with respect to the Search For Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). Although it is possible that a radio
signal from an extraterrestrial civilization could be broadcast at
any frequency, the ability to detect such a signal is frequencydependent. The greater the distance from which a signal of given
strength comes, the harder it is to detect it; however, there exists
a frequency band in which it is possible to maximize the distance
over which a signal can travel and still be detected. This band,
1.400 to 1.727 GHz, lies essentially at those frequencies where
naturally emitted background noise is least. At other frequencies
the feasibility of detecting an artificial signal of extraterrestrial
origin would be diminished; thus necessity should mandate that a
passive service devoted to SETI have preference with respect to an
allocation of the 1.400 to 1.727 GHz band, at least over users for
whom the band is less critical.
As we have indicated, the necessity of the passive services is a
public necessity. We have shown that service to the public is the
essence of the public interest and that the need of the listening
public may not be ignored in the granting of a frequency license.'
It is of the highest importance, therefore, to realize that the passive services exist for no motive of financial profit for business
enterprise, but to further the enrichment of public knowledge and
scientific progress through scholarly research. This dedication to
(1st revision, Nov. 1975). Some of the most important lines and the ± 1% frequency band about them are given in the following table (however, the frequency
of the hydrogen line may be subject to larger velocity-shifts than the others).
LINE
Deuterium (D)
Neutral Hydrogen (H)
Hydroxyl (OH)

CH Molecule
Formaldehyde (HCO)

FREQUENCY BAND
322.
- 332.
MHz
1.3501.435 GHz
1.5961.628 GHz (4 lines)

3.2303.3024.782-

3.296 GHz
3.382 GHz (2 lines)
4.878 GHz

Water (1-0)

14.34 - 14.63
22.01 - 22.46

GHz
GHz

Ammonia (NH.)

23.45 - 24.38

GHz (4 lines)

24.81 - 25.31

GHz

Carbon Monoxide (CO)

109.10 - 111.306 GHz
114.12 -116.42

GHz

There are many somewhat less important molecular lines, especially at frequencies
above 30 GHz.
10°See cases cited notes 170 & 171 supra.
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the public is total. Research results in the areas of radio astronomy,
space research, and SETI are published in the open scientific literature without protection of patent or copyright; they may be read
and used by all.
The passive services, inter se, pose no license assignment problems. The passive services transmit no signals and can therefore
cause no interference. Unlike other frequencies, which can only
be preserved for the use of a limited number of broadcasters, allocation to passive services allows reception by all who care to do so.
Normally, rationing of available licenses is a significant portion
of the FCC's responsibility. Indeed, the need for rationing exists
in all utilities, and the regulatory agency is the rationer. With
respect to passive users, there is no such need excepting, of course,
to limit potential active users to other frequencies. Because bands
allocated to the passive services are accessible to all, they have a
uniquely public character.
We believe that the public interest requirement is determined by
the existence of a policy in favor of promoting scientific research.
The public commitment to scientific research is impressive. Billions
of dollars in public funds have paid not only for sophisticated
scientific instruments, but also for the training and support of
thousands of highly capable people over the past 20 years.' This
massive expenditure by both the state and federal governments is
but a part of the public policy of furthering human knowledge and
scientific progress, a policy that has its roots in the Constitution's
itself.
201 Federal

agencies which have contributed impressively to scientific research

include the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-

ministration and the Atomic Energy Commission (superseded by the Energy Research and Development Agency). The Viking mission to Mars, alone, cost ap-

proximately one billion dollars.
2 2 U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. This section enumerates the powers of Congress, and the clause to which we refer authorizes it to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." What

is significant here is that this clause, which forms the basis for our patent system,
is not couched as a protection of individual rights, but as a method of promoting
a public purpose. The framers of the Constitution could have protected an inventor's rights in his discovery on the theory that as discoverer, he should be
entitled to a property right therein; no doubt this is exactly how many inventors
regard their patents. But there is no purpose here to protect a property right or
any other personal right. The policy sought to be established is the promotion of

scientific progress, and the award of the patent power to Congress was made
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The scope of the national commitment to provide financial support for scientific research is also evidenced by the large number
of congressionally created agencies which supply funds for research
scientists as federal civil servants.' In addition, virtually every
for this purpose alone. No less, even than freedom of expression and the protection of the rights of accused persons, the advancement of scientific progress is
explicitly mandated as a policy goal by the Constitution.
Judicial support for this position may be found. It has been held that the
primary purpose of our patent system is not to reward the individual, but to
advance the sciences and arts. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325
U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945). The objective of the clause has been said to be "to
promote the progress of science and the arts." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
552, 555, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973). State trade secret laws have been
upheld explicitly because they were found to advance this constitutional policy of
stimulating progress in science and the useful arts. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
2
03 The largest and most important of these outside the fields of health, medi-me, and social science include the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Science Foundation (NSF), the Smithsonian Institute and National Zoological Park, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and the United States Geological Survey. Agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park
Service, and the Naval Observatory, which support relatively modest research
programs are numerous.
Of these agencies, two are concerned with every area of science known to
man. These are the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science
Foundation. NAS is not really a funding agency, but is charged with defining and
investigating scientific policies. 36 U.S.C. §§ 251-54 (1970). NSF, on the other
hand, was intended to be the government's main instrument for developing United
States leadership in all scientific disciplines. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1861-82 (1970 &
Supp. III 1973), as amended by, Act of April 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-273, 90
Stat. 378; Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-282, 90 Stat. 473; Act of Oct. 11,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-471, 90 Stat. 2057. This agency has a sweeping mandate to
initiate and support basic scientific research programs, to strengthen the national
scientific research potential, and to encourage and recommend the pursuit of national policies for the promotion of basic research. Id. § 1862. Its budget in
fiscal 1977 was about $700,000,000. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1977, No. 4-76a, Government Contracts Service, at B-15
(March 15, 1976). Most of this was distributed to scientists in nonprofit institutions to pay salaries, purchase equipment, construct and maintain facilities, and
otherwise support all aspects of research. Among the passive services, radio astronomy derives almost its entire support from the Foundation.
Other agencies have been directed to support particular areas of scientific
research deemed of special importance. Under the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-84 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by,
Act of April 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-273, 90 Stat. 379-80; Act of June 4, 1976,
Pub. L. No, 94-307, 90 Stat. 681; Act of Sept. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-413,
90 Stat. 1270; Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1988, it is the
duty of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to increase human
knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and in space, id. § 2451(c)(1);
to study the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for scientific purposes,
id. S 2451(c)(4); to preserve the role of the United States as a leader in
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executive department has authority to employ scientists to con-

duct research into natural phenomena, the study of which may
further the purposes of the department in question. ' The volume
of legislation that specifically protects the research interests of scientists is equally impressive. Indeed, such protection has been one
of the main purposes of twentieth century environmental legislation. Many geographical areas have been granted protection because of their unique scientific value.' In addition, two major
aeronautical and space science and the application thereof, id. § 2451(c)(5);
to provide monetary support for scientific research which has value to aeronautical and space activities, id. § 2458; to conduct or arrange for the conduct of scientific studies by means of the use of aeronautical and space vehicles,
id. § 2473(c)(2); and to carry out a comprehensive program of research into
upper atmospheric phenomena, id. 5§ 2481-2484. Congress has, over the years,
appropriated billions of dollars to fund scientific studies by NASA. Among the
passive services, space research is almost entirely supported by NASA, and it is
likely also that SETI will derive its primary support from that agency.
The ever-increasing importance of basic scientific research to the national
welfare is evidenced by the creation of the Energy Research and Development
Administration. Our entire hope for energy self-sufficiency rests upon gaining a
sufficient understanding of processes of nature at the molecular, atomic, and
elementary particle levels. ERDA has broad authority to support and conduct
research which will lead to improved knowledge of the multifarous ways in which
nature produces energy, as well as research which will better our understanding
of those natural phenomena which promise to improve our ability to use energy
more efficiently, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5813 (Supp. V 1975). This embraces so wide
an area that ERDA may ultimately become the most important of the sciencesupport agencies. As yet it does not significantly support any of the passive services; however, radio astronomical investigations of pulsars, quasars, x-ray stars,
and other celestial objects are likely to be increasingly relevant to its area of
concern.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has as its goal the
conduct and support of research aimed at understanding the dynamics of the
upper and lower atmosphere, the sea, the earth, and the interaction among them.
15 U.S.C. § 1511 (Supp. V 1975). NOAA has supported radio astronomical investigations aimed at understanding solar activity and its influence on climate
and weather. The United States Geological Survey is charged with the hiring of
scientists to determine the geological structure of the national domain. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 31, 34 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Among its most important present concerns
is the understanding and prediction of earthquakes. The radio astronomical technique of very-long-base-line interferometry (VLBI) promises to enable highly
accurate determination of earth motions, and future construction of a multimillion dollar national VLBI facility could be a concern of both USGS and NSF.
Finally, the Smithsonian Institute and National Zoological Park are charged with
the general advancement of scientific knowledge and its diffusion among men,
20 U.S.C. §§ 41, 81 (1970), as well as with specific research tasks in the area
of anthropology, paleontology, and biology.
"'See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 5 3104 (1970); 7 U.S.C. § 427 (1970).
20'These include Apostle Islands National Lakeshore, 16 U.S.C. § 460w
(1970); Cumberland Island National Seashore, id. 5 459i (Supp. V 1975); Ice
Age National Scientific Reserve, id. § 469d; Kings Range National Conservation
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pieces of environmental legislation, the 1974 Amendments to the
Historic Sites Act of 1935... and the National Environmental Policy
of 19690 ' may, by their explicit terms, protect the passive services.
If this interpretation is correct, they set standards which bind the
OTP as well as the FCC. At the least, they further evidence
the public policy of promoting scientific research.
C. Interpretationof Environmental Legislation
We deal first with the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. The expressed purpose of this Act is to protect "all components of the natural environment" from the "profound impact
of man's activity. 2.. The relevant question for our discussion is
whether radio signals produced by natural phenomena or incident
upon the Earth from space beyond the domain of man constitute
a component of the natural environment. If they do, then interference with these signals is regulated by the terms of the Environmental Policy Act.
The radio signals studied by the passive services seem part of
the environment since these signals are physical entities which
owe their existence to no human activity. They are no different in
this respect from forests, lakes, or wild animal populations. Furthermore, it seems frequently to have been the intent of Congress to
include scientific interests as protected objects within the scope of
various environmental protection statutes."2 This intent is nowhere
better evidenced than by the 1974 Amendments to the Historic
Sites Act of 1935,10 which we will shortly discuss in some detail.
From this the conclusion follows that it would be consistent with
congressional policy to treat as a component of the environment
electromagnetic radiation generated by mechanisms beyond the
control of man and of importance to scientific studies.
This conclusion is different from a claim that the radio spectrum
which has often been called a natural resource, is part of the environment. We have pointed out before that although individual
Area, id. § 460y; Buffalo National River, id.5 460m-8 (Supp. V 1975); and
Spruce Knob-Seneca Rocks National Recreation Area, id.§ 460p-4.
- 16 U.S.C. 55 469-469(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

-742 U.S.C. 55 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Osa
ld. § 4331(a).
See examples cited note 205 supra.
21016 U.S.C. §5 469-469(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
009
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electromagnetic waves are physical entities, the "radio spectrum"
is not; 11 hence our arguments, the concern of which is only the
classification of particular, individual electromagnetic waves as
environmental components, do not apply to the "radio spectrum."
We do not wish to advance any general proposition that "pollution
of the airwaves" by excessive transmission requires that every allocation and licensing decision by frequency-management agencies
fall within the scope of the Environmental Policy Act. Indeed,
radio signals received by active services are generated by human
activities, and it is therefore hard to imagine that they are components of the environment. Our argument is limited strictly to
interference with specific electromagnetic signals which are of nonhuman origin and also are important objects of scientific study.
So limited, we believe we are supported by the terms of the
Environmental Policy Act. Pursuant thereto, environmental impact
statements are required to discuss the "relationship between local
short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity."'" This evidences congressional concern with such relationships and implies that it is a
purpose of the Act to bring to light those situations where shortterm activities affect long-term productivity. Interference with
scientific progress is as serious a threat to long-term productivity
and the overall betterment of the human condition as can be
imagined. Thus to consider electromagnetic waves, which are of
interest for scientific study, as an environmental component within
the scope of the Environmental Policy Act would be consistent
with the purpose of Congress in passing that Act.
If the radiation which the passive services seek to study is a
component of the environment, what is the effect of the Environmental Policy Act on the frequency-management agencies? Perhaps the most important effect is to create grounds for judicial
review of decisions of the Office of Telecommunications Policy.
Under section 305 of the Communications Act, the assignment
of frequencies to government radio stations is wholly at the discretion of the President."' The Communications Act sets no standards whatsoever to govern frequency allocation by the President
"I'See

Section III-A supra.

2'42 U.S.C. 5 4332(C)(iv) (1970).
1 See Section II-B supra.
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or his delegate, the OTP. Such OTP decisions, therefore, are not
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act."" Where, however, law defines standards that should govern
the making of an agency decision, it no longer can be considered
to be action "committed to agency discretion."'' . The Environmental Policy Act contains standards which are not to be found
in the Communications Act. Specifically, all federal agencies are
required to consider environmental values in their decision-making,"1 to study and develop alternative courses of action where
there is conflict concerning possible uses of available resources,""
and to act in a manner which will avoid unnecessary environmental
harm." ' On this basis it can be argued that any OTP frequencyallocation decision which has been made without consideration of
interference with the passive services, or without a showing that
there exists no reasonable alternatives to causing such interference,
is subject to review and reversal by a federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act. We repeat our caveat that electromagnetic waves transmitted by other services may not properly be
characterized as components of the environment. We believe,
therefore, that the power of review of OTP decisions does not
reside in the federal courts unless the issue is interference with the
passive services.
Whatever the intent of the Environmental Policy Act with respect to scientific interests, there can be no question at all that
their protection was the primary purpose of the 1974 Amendments
to the Historic Sites Act of 1935."1 It is not clear, however, to
what extent this legislation affects the telecommunications area.
At the very least, the Amendments are an explicit and recent reaffirmation of the congressional policy in favor of the furtherance
of scientific research. It can be argued that they also mandate
specific statutory standards for the treatment of the passive services
by the telecommunications agencies.
The 1974 Amendments replaced and broadened an earlier ex4

See 5 U.S.C. S 701 (1970).
'15 See cases at notes 78-80 supra.
2

216 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1970).
17Id. § 4332(E) (Supp. V 1975).
8

211d. § 4331 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
218 16 U.S.C. §5 469-469(c)

(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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tension of the 1935 Act,220 which had merely applied to historical
or archeological data that might be lost as the result of the construction of Federal or federally licensed dams, reservoirs, or related projects. The main thrust of the new Amendments is to require that the Secretary of the Interior undertake the "recovery,
protection, and preservation ' ' "l of "significant scientific, prehistorical, historical, or archeological data"' " which may be irreparably
lost or destroyed by "any Federal or federally assisted or licensed
project, activity, or program."" They have strengthened the degree
of protection available to the types of data in question, increased
the number of different types of data which are eligible for this
protection, and broadened the activities against which the protection is available to include essentially all activities of the federal
government.
We must here inquire whether the scientific data which is the
object of study by the passive telecommunications services is touched by these Amendments. Three specific issues are posed: (1) Do
frequency allocation and licensing by federal agencies fall within
the category of federal activities to which the Amendments apply?;
(2) Are radio signals, generated either by natural processes or artificially, by non-human intelligent extraterrestrial life, scientific data
within the meaning of the Amendments?; (3) Do the Amendments
govern only in situations where alteration of terrain or construction
is the direct or proximate cause of a threatened loss of data, or does
their protection extend to all instances where there is a threatened
loss of data and there is activity which involves alteration of terrain? There can be no straight-forward resolution of the latter two
issues because the Amendments are ambiguously worded, and different parts appear to support different conclusions. We rest our
analysis wherever possible on the plain meaning of the statutory
language; however, to resolve the ambiguities presented, it is necessary to consider what must have been the intent of Congress. For
this task, the legislative history' is a useful, though not totally
illuminating guide.
220
2121

16 U.S.C. S 469 (1970).
16 U.S.C. S 469a-1 (Supp. V 1975).

22
U
Id.
212 16 U.S.C. S 469a-2 (Supp. V 1975).
H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in, [19741 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEws 3168.

CODE
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There is, however, no ambiguity with respect to the first issue.
By the explicit wording of the Amendments, they apply to "any
Federal, federally assisted, or licensed project, activity or program." The regulatory power of the FCC is specifically designated as "licensing" by the Communications Act, while the functioning of the OTP is surely a "federal program or activity" within
the meaning of the statutory language. Moreover, the intent of
Congress, according to the legislative history, appears to have been
that the Act be broadly construed. We cite the following quotations:
H.R. 296 would broaden and revise this program (protection of
archeological and historical sites threatened by dam construction)
by making it applicable to all Federal construction programs and
all programs licensed or otherwise assisted by Federal agencies."
The burdens imposed by H.R. 296 are not too severe. They require Federal agencies to be cognizant of historic and scientific
values, to take them into account in the early planning processes,
and to provide adequate time and funds for specific survey and
salvage operations."'
As indicated, the proposal legislation expands the applicability of
the program to all Federal agencies having construction projects.
The proposed language, however is not limited to construction projects, per se, so that if a Federal agency finds or is made aware
that any Federal program or federally assisted construction project or activity will cause the loss of scientific, prehistorical, historical, archeological, or paleontological data, then the agency must
notify the Secretary of Interior of this fact and supply him with the
information relevant to the matter.2
In addition, the letter from the General Counsel of Housing and
Urban Development published in the legislative history' requests
clarification of what constitutes a "federally assisted" or "federally
licensed project, activity or program," because this language is
susceptible to a very broad interpretation. Such clarification was
not made and this language was enacted into law. Discussion in the
16 U.S.C. §§ 469, 469a-1, 469a-2 (Supp. V 1975).
"I H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in, [1974] U.S.
CoNo. & AD. NEws 3168, 3170 (emphasis added).
2
Id. at 5, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3171.
22

28
Id.
9

at 7, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & At. NEws at 3172.
1d. at 15-17, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3180-82.

CODE
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legislative history makes the point that the bill "seeks to cover
virtually all Federal undertakings."'" * Hence, there is no difficulty
in applying the Amendments to all radio transmissions.
The second issue concerns not whether the radio signals which
are objects of study for the passive services are scientific data, but
whether scientific data of this nature are protected by the Amendments. It can be argued that Congress intended to protect only data
of a historical, archeological, paleontological, or geological nature;
in other words, only data buried in the ground. Certainly there
are parts of the legislative history which suggest that this might
be the case. However, other parts of the legislative history, and
more importantly, the explicit wording of the statutes themselves,
suggest otherwise. We believe that Congress intended to give comprehensive protection to data buried in the ground, but did not
intend to limit this protection to such data; this is the only interpretation consistent with both the legislative history and the Amendments themselves.
In sections 469a-1 and 469a-2, of the Amendments: the categories of protected data are distinguished and labelled. They are:
historical, archeological, prehistorical (paleontological) and scientific. Section 469"' refers only to historical and archeological data,
but modifies this reference with the parenthetical phrase "including
relics and specimens." This suggests the Amendments were not
intended to be limited in their application to relics and specimens
only. Moreover, the law, as it existed before the Amendments, protected archeological and historical data, and the legislative history
manifests an intent to broaden its coverage, to make federal
agencies "cognizant of historic and scientific ... values,"' and to
extend its application "to virtually all Federal undertakings."' This
purpose can be accomplished only if full effect is given to the language of sections 469a-1 and 469a-2. We submit that this language
should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. Four kinds
of data are carefully distinguished. Three of these are very par2 30

1

231
232

d. at 6, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 3171 (emphasis added).
16 U.S.C. § 469a-1, 469a-2 (Supp. V 1975).
16 U.S.C. S 469 (Supp. V 1975).

21

H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in, [1974] U.S.
& AD. NEWS 3168, 3171.
- Id. at 6, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3171.
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ticularly and narrowly defined classes of data. The fourth category
is "scientific" data, and "scientific" is as general a term as could
possibly have been chosen. If those who drafted the statute had
meant to limit its application to scientific data buried in the
ground, they surely could have chosen a more specific word that
conveyed this meaning clearly. Had they meant "scientific" to denote a category of data less broad, such as geological data, they
could have used "geological"; note again their careful delineation
of "archeological," "historical," and "prehistorical." The doctrine
of ejusdem generis seems precluded by the fact that in sections
469a-1 and 469a-2 "scientific" precedes the words "prehistorical,
historical, archeological" and is not modified by the word "other."
It appears to us that the word "scientific" implies a broad intent to
protect scientific data, including that not buried in the ground. Electromagnetic radiation generated by agencies beyond the control of
man and of importance for scientific studies is the very essence of
scientific data; it seems to be protected by these Amendments.
The only remaining problem involves the possible necessity of
an alteration of the terrain before the protection of the Amendments may be invoked. The previous law was strictly limited in its
application to construction projects of particular kinds. Activities
clearly covered by the new law are very much more diverse, but
the statute still contains reference to alteration of terrain. There is
reason to doubt that its continuation is deliberate. It appears only
in section 469, which was changed but little by the 1974 legislation; there is no mention of alteration of terrain in sections 469a-1
and 469a-2. Since section 469 purports to describe the purpose of
sections 469a-1 and 469a-2, we must conclude the statute gives
no protection absent some alteration of terrain. The wording of
sections 469a-1 and 469a-2, however, is sufficiently broad in its
scope that it creates a real ambiguity concerning the degree to
which alteration of terrain must be the proximate cause of harm
to protected data. If we turn to the legislative history to resolve
the ambiguity, we would argue that limiting protection against
threatened harm to that proximately caused by alteration of terrain
is not consistent with the intent expressed therein that the Amendments apply to "virtually all Federal undertakings," and that they
not be limited to construction projects per se.' The legislative his2

Id. at 6, 7, [1974] U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws at 3171, 3172.
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tory, furthermore, contains other suggestions that the wording in
section 469 is not evidence of a Congressional intent to require that
alteration of terrain be a direct, proximate or immediate cause of
a threat to protected data before such protection can be given effect.
In particular, a letter from the Department of Agriculture emphasizes that section 469 could be broadly construed even without
reference to sections 469a-1 and 469a-2:
That part of the proposed amendment ... specifically, "any alteration of the terrain caused as a result of any Federal, federally
assisted, or federally licensed activity or program" needs clarification as to the areas of applicability. As written, this provision could
be construed as applying to essentially every activity of the Federal Government-defense, space, natural resources, agriculture,
commerce and transportation, community development and housing, health, education, etc.-wherein Federal assistance, directly or
indirectly, resulted in action altering the terrain."'
This objection was ignored and Congress passed the legislation unchanged. We believe therefore that Congress did not intend to
require that alteration of terrain be the proximate cause of harm
to scientific data.2"
Id. at 14, [1974] U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3180.
The wording of S 469 provides protection against data loss "as the result
of . . . alteration of terrain." It does not say it must be proximately caused by
alteration of terrain. One can advance arguments based both on statutory construction and on principles of physics that loss of scientific data as a result of
radio-frequency interference may be deemed, within the meaning of § 469 to
result from alteration of terrain. The statutory construction argument is that the
COmmunications Act so intimately links construction of transmission facilities to
actual transmissions that where the latter cause loss of scientific data, that loss
may be deemed within the meaning of the Amendments, to result from the construction activity. This argument is based on § 308(a) of the Communications
Act, which provides that a construction permit must be sought from the FCC,
and this permit is required in addition to a frequency license. That a statute intended to prevent interference with radio reception requires specific licensing
of construction projects is tantamount to Congressional recognition of the construction as the legal cause of the interference. This thesis is supported by the
physical argument. The location of transmission facilities in one location may
result in interference to them, but construction of that facility in another location
could prevent the interference. Therefore it will often (and perhaps always) be
the case that whether there will be interference depends upon which terrain is
to be altered. Section 303(d) of the Communications Act provides that the FCC
shall determine the location of transmitting stations; the FCC may enforce its
determination by withholding a construction permit under § 308(a). We feel that
this provides sufficient rationale for considering injury to the passive services
through alteration of terrain, whatever importance COngress intended the wording
of § 469 to have.
23
23
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We conclude that the Amendments arguably apply to radio signals of scientific importance. Data in the form of radio signals can
be "protected" by barring interfering transmissions on their frequency, and can be "recovered" and "preserved" in the literal, physical sense, by their detection and recordation with a radio telescope
or other receiving apparatus. It would seem, therefore, that a frequency licensee might be barred from constructing transmission
facilities which would interfere with one of the passive services until
scientific observations of importance could be carried out, or until
another frequency may be found for the potentially interferencecausing transmission. The power conferred on the Secretary of
Interior here would seem only to allow him to make the scientific
observation which would constitute recovery and preservation of
the data. The requirements of the Amendments, however, also apply directly to federal agencies such as the FCC and the OTP.
Hence a party who would otherwise have standing to sue under the
Administrative Procedure Act would have grounds to sue where
one of the agencies failed to comply with these standards. Such suit
could challenge the agency action which created the particular
threat to scientific data.
If a more restrictive interpretation of the Amendments prevails,
barring their direct applicability to radio interference, they are
still evidence of the public policy in favor of the furtherance of
scientific research which is determinative of the public interest with
respect to radio spectrum management.
D. Regulation of Spurious Emissions
It is appropriate at this point to consider the problem of interference with the passive services as a result of spurious emissions.
This is a problem of special importance to the passive services since
they must detect weaker signals than must other services; however,
it may be anticipated that, as the spectrum becomes increasingly
crowded, other services will also experience trouble with spurious
emissions. The same relief that is available to the passive services
should also be available to them.
Spurious emission is regulated by the FCC on a service-to-service
basis; technical standards are mandated for each broadcast service,
and these include restrictions on the fraction of radiation which
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may be emitted in bands other than that assigned to a licensee."'
Moreover, in recognition of the fact that passive services are more
vulnerable to interference from spurious radiation than other services, some special protection provisions have been established by
the FCC. In general, however, the FCC follows section 116A of
the International Radio Regulations, which provides no greater protection for the passive services against spurious radiation than are
received by any other telecommunications service.
Section 324 of the Communications Act requires that "all radio
stations, including those owned and operated by the United States,
shall use the minimum amount of power necessary to carry out the
communications desired."'' Strictly speaking, no power at all is
necessary in frequency bands outside of the one which is intended
to be used for the transmission in question. As we have indicated,'
however, spurious emission outside of a licensee's assigned frequency band is an unavoidable consequence of the operation of
physical laws, but can be reduced proportionately to the effort and
expenditure the licensee is required to make. Financial sacrifice
may legally be required of a licensee if it is in the public interest
and does not spell destruction of a public service."' We believe,
therefore, that the level of out-of-band power "necessary to carry
out the communication desired" is the level below which further
reduction would lead to economic losses for the licensee so severe
that it would spell destruction or diminution of service to the public.' If section 324 is viewed as establishing a standard for the
regulation of spurious emissions, by its wording that standard
applies to the OTP as well as the FCC, and provides another basis
for judicial review of OTP decisions.
Of course, if the passive services are not adequately protected
against spurious radiation in their allocated bands, the allocation
of such bands to them serves no purpose and is arguably arbitrary
and capricious. The minimum power requirement of section 324,
2"See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 5.103 (1976), which prescribes spurious radiation
standards for experimental radio services, and 47 C.F.R. S§73.682, .699 (1976)
which serve the same function for television stations.
'947 U.S.C. § 324 (1970).

11 See Section II supra.
21 See discussion Section I-A(1) supra.
2a This is a direct application of the rationale of Carroll Broadcasting v. FCC,
258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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therefore, is not the only legal standard which governs spurious
radiation. Wherever spurious radiation arising from the transmissions of one service makes impossible reception of signals by some
other service in its allocated bands, the FCC must evaluate the
public interest, convenience, and necessity with respect to the
specific level of spurious radiation involved. In this evaluation it
must take into account the public policy in favor of the furtherance
of scientific progress, and the requirements of environmental legislation. Moreover, with respect to the allowable level of spurious
radiation, the OTP, though it is bound by no public interest standard, is bound by any explicit or implicit requirements of environmental legislation relevant to the passive services.
E. Summary
We have in this section discussed the standards which govern
frequency allocation to the passive services. We have considered
the meaning of "public interest, convenience, or necessity," and
sought to interpret its application to the passive services in the light
of federal science policy. We have also examined other standards
set by the Communications Act and discussed legislation outside
the telecommunications area that appears to protect scientific research interests. Our principal conclusions may be summarized as
follows:
I. There are three principal areas that may be said to comprise
the public interest as defined by telecommunications case law. These
are (a) conformity with both the specific requirements and general purposes of the Communications Act of 1934 and, where applicable, with the Communications Satellite Act of 1962; (b) principles of telecommunications policy that are derived from the use
of the word "public" to delineate those interests which are paramount; and (c) public policy in its broadest sense.
2. The "necessity" of which telecommunications law speaks may
be defined, at least in so far as frequency allocation is concerned,
in terms of the feasibility of a desired user operating in one part
of the spectrum as opposed to some other part. This is public necessity because it is the express policy of the Communications Act and
the Communications Satellite Act to maximize efficiency of spectrum usage.
3. Public interest and necessity mandate that, with respect to
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frequency allocation, the passive services be given a limited preference. The reasons for this conclusion span the categories of public
interest and necessity that we have defined and number five: (a)
the passive services represent an interest of part of the community;
(b) the passive services exist not for any motive of financial profit
to some business enterprise, but for the benefit of all citizens
through the enrichment of public knowledge and the furtherance of
scientific progress; (c) no rationing of passive services, inter se, is
required as all may share equally; (d) the size and location of
frequency bands required for the passive services is generally a
matter of necessity, mandated by laws of physics over which man
has no control; and (e) there exists a public poilicy in favor of the
promotion of scientific investigations, which is grounded in the
Constitution and expressed in numerous enactments of the Congress.
4. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the 1974
Amendments to the Historic Sites Act of 1935 may protect the
radio signals studied by the passive services from interference by
transmissions licensed or otherwise made pursuant to Federal authority. An effect of this would be that where important interests of
the passive services are involved, these acts mandate legal standards
that remove frequency allocation decisions by the OTP from the
area of "agency action committed to agency discretion." Therefore, such decisions are subject to judicial review by federal courts
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
5. Spurious emission should be regulated by both the FCC and
the OTP in accordance with section 324 of the Communications
Act of 1934, which we believe requires the lowest level of out-ofband radiated power which may be achieved without requiring a
licensee to suffer economic loss so serious that the public will be
deprived of service. Furthermore, spurious emission levels may not
be so high as to prevent a service from receiving signals in bands
allocated to it.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW

AND THE PASSIVE SERVICES

This article would be incomplete without a brief exploration of
the availability of judicial relief to the passive services in the event
that their interests should be compromised by the frequency man-
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agement agencies. We are primarily concerned with the circumstances under which individual scientists and research institutions,
including government agencies, would have standing to seek judicial review of FCC and OTP decisions. We note, however, that
rarely would an individual scientist have the financial resources to
support a lawsuit, while even research institutions, since they earn
no profit, might find it difficult to protect their interests in court.
The United States and, therefore, both the FCC and the OTP,
may not be sued without its consent. Two statutes provide such
consent. These are the Communications Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. ' Under the Communications Act, appeal may
be taken from decisions and orders of the FCC by any person
aggrieved only as a result of award or denial of a license or other
permit by the Commission." Any party whose interests are adversely affected by a frequency-allocation decision may not seek
judicial review of that decision, but must challenge individually
every frequency license granted pursuant to it. Since members of
the passive services cannot seek licenses of their own, but must
depend on allocations for protection, this would make it extremely
difficult for them to obtain relief in the event of arbitrary FCC
action. The Administrative Procedure Act, however, provides a
much broader consent and allows frequency-allocation decisions to
be challenged directly.
Any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."'
"'Agency action' includes the whole or part of an agency rule, order,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent, or denial thereof, or failure to
act." Any institution or individual which suffers any injury that
is recognized by some statute, or any other legal injury, on account
of any agency decision, or the failure of an agency to make a decision, may seek judicial review. Furthermore, this consent extends
to essentially all agencies of the federal government,"' and includes
I See note 62 supra.
247 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970).
- 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970 & Act of Oct. 31, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721).
- ld. § 551(13) (1970).
-7Id. S 701(b).
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the FCC, the President and the OTP, and all executive departments.
A party aggrieved as a result of a frequency allocation may challenge that decision directly. We have already noted, however, that
"agency action committed to agency discretion by law" is immune
from judicial review, " and therefore decisions of the OTP and the
State Department which affect frequency allocations are not ordinarily subject to challenge."" The one exception to this is where
interests of the passive services which are protected by environmental legislation are involved. These laws provide legal standards
which are non-discretionary in their application " and, if relevant,
serve to make frequency-allocation decisions of the OTP subject
to judicial review. We note again'"' that courts are reluctant to
consider any challenges to an agency decision which appears to be
a request that they make a redetermination of a factual matter in
which the agency has special competence.
There remains, however, the question of who has standing to
complain should there be a frequency allocation or other decision
which would adversely affect scientific research. The rule which
governs this issue was enunciated in Sierra Club v. Morton," which
involved a suit to block private development of federal land adjacent to a national park by an environmental organization that
claimed standing as a party aggrieved by agency action under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was dismissed without consideration of its merits because neither the organization nor its members had anything more at stake than a
general interest in conservation. The court held that although Congress might grant standing to whomever it chose provided a genuine case or controversy existed, the Administrative Procedure Act
did not modify the traditional rule that a party suffer particular
injury before he will be heard by a court. Such injury need not be
economic in nature, but must be personal to plaintiff and therefore
different from any which may be suffered by the public in general.
Once standing is established, however, the public welfare may be
8

Id. § 701(a).

41
214See

Section III supra.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164
(6th Cir. 1972).
25

21

See note 162 supra.

-2

405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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asserted with respect to the merits of the case.
Given this rule, we believe that individual scientists, as well as
institutions devoted to scientific research, have standing to challenge frequency-management agency decisions where their own research interests are directly affected. As we have repeatedly noted,
the general public is injured as a result of any interference with
scientific research. That injury is the ultimate denial to the public
of the benefits which may result from increased human knowledge.
The individual who actually would do the research suffers a different and more particular harm: interference with his ability to pursue his professional livelihood. Arguably individuals or institutions
whose research interests are affected by frequency-allocation decisions have standing to challenge them in court because of this
interference. "

It should be noted, however, that it is only the frequency management agency which may be sued. The spectrum user whose
transmissions would cause the injurious interference has a complete defense if he transmits pursuant to a license issued by appropriate federal authority. There is but one exception to this rule,
and it involves communications satellite systems.
The Communications Satellite Act authorizes the Attorney
General of the United States to petition a district court of the
United States for such equitable relief as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent or terminate any conduct or threat of conduct
by the Communications Satellite Corporation or any other person
which would be inconsistent with the policies and purposes declared in section 701 of that Act; these include a requirement of
economical and efficient spectrum usage.m Satellite systems may
operate at any frequency at all within a very wide range. It is the
very essence of efficiency of spectrum usage that engineering studies
which design them should engineer them not only to operate at
frequencies at which the spurious radiation they generate will cause
the least injury to other services, but also to generate the least possible amount of spurious radiation. In particular, the protection
23

5 The Supreme Court has long recognized that one's right to pursue a profession is a liberty which may not be denied without due process of law. Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1922); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
47 U.S.C. 5 743 (1970).
2
See S. REP. No. 1587, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in, [19621 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2269, 2270, quoted at note 61 supra.
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needs of the passive services must be considered since they are
vulnerable to lower power levels of interfering radiation than other
services and because they have little or no freedom to operate outside of the narrow bands selected for them by the laws of nature.
This responsibility rests as much on the operator of a satellite system as it does on the FCC. Comsat or any other telecommunications corporation is likely to have available to it greater expertise
than a federal regulatory agency. Very often the FCC, when presented with a plan for a specific satellite system, might have no
choice but either to approve it in full or to reject it. Reengineering
might not be feasible, nor might the commmission know what degree of re-engineering might be possible. Furthermore, section 743
of the Communications Satellite Act evidences a congressional intent that Comsat and other private parties should themselves bear
responsibility for ensuring that the policies and purposes of section
701 are effected. Therefore we conclude that designers and operators of communications satellite systems have an affirmative responsibility to ensure that they make use of the radio spectrum in
an efficient and economical manner, and especially that they will
not cause avoidable interference to the passive services. Where this
responsibility is not met, the Attorney General may seek in court
appropriate relief.
That individual spectrum users may not be sued on account of
their transmissions pursuant to a valid federal license is important
for one other reason. It makes it possible for a government agency,
such as NOAA or NASA, which uses the radio spectrum for passive scientific research, or for any other purpose, to seek judicial
review of an FCC decision adversely affecting such use. This rule
is established over the claim of identity of parties to the suit by
several cases, including United States v. ICC' and United States
v. Nixon.' 7 It is stated as follows, "the mere assertion of a claim
of 'intra-branch' dispute [does not] defeat federal jurisdiction.""
To decide whether there is jurisdiction, "courts must look behind
names that symbolize the parties to determine" whether there is a
real dispute and who are the true parties in interest."' In United
256

337 U.S. 426 (1949).

z7 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

d. at 693.
1 1d.; United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949).

2'5
9
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States v. ICC26 ° the real parties in interest were the United States,
as a shipper in interstate commerce, and certain railroads. The dispute concerned an order of the ICC which denied the government
a recovery in damages for exaction of an allegedly unlawful railroad rate. In United States v. Nixon ' the real parties in interest
were the United States, as prosecutor in a criminal case, and
Richard Nixon, an individual who believed he did not have to
surrender certain evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. If
a situation should arise in which the FCC had allocated certain
frequency bands or made some other decision which prejudiced
the ability of a federal agency to pursue its Congressional mandate,
the real parties in interest would be the United States, as radio
spectrum user, and the private or commercial interest for whose
benefit the FCC decision had been made. The private party being
immune from suit, the United States could have no remedy but
against the FCC, and it is precisely this remedy which is allowed
by the precedents cited.
By the same logic, a federal agency could not seek judicial review
of a decision of the OTP. That agency acts for the benefit of no private or commercial parties, but only for that of other government
departments. The aggrieved agency could appeal to the President,
who has final authority over government spectrum usage under the
Communications Act,"" but the courts would be closed to it.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

We have completed our exploration of the frequency allocation
problem with respect to the passive services. Our principal conclusion is that the requirement"' that frequency allocation be governed by "public interest, convenience, or necessity" mandates that
both federal science policy and the special character of the passive
services be considered by the FCC in all frequency allocation decisions which may affect the passive services. The frequency management powers of the OTP and the State Department, however,
may make it difficult or impossible for the FCC to act as Congress
-0337 U.S. 426 (1949).
1418 U.S. 683 (1974).
-247 U.S.C. § 305 (1970).
"347 U.S.C. § 303(c) (Supp. V 1975).
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intended it should; this situation threatens harm to all spectrum
users, but may be especially serious for economically weak groups
such as the passive services. Although judicial relief may be available to the passive services even against the OTP, such relief is
expensive and subject to the uncertainties which beset all litigation.
Congress could greatly improve this situation by revising section
323 of the Communications Act, as we have suggested. ' That, plus
judicial awareness of the motivation for specific international agreements, would solve the multiple authority problem. We would
recommend that Congress do more. The Communications Act is
now more than forty years old, and many of its provisions were
originally part of the Radio Act of 1927. It is especially a law
written to govern use of the spectrum by essentially one type of
user-the radio broadcaster. We think that Congress should consider revising the Act and incorporating into it new standards which
will more clearly define the important considerations with respect
to frequency allocations and assignments to services and individuals
of greatly differing character. Certainly it would be appropriate to
provide special criteria for the allocation of bands to passive scientific research; for example Congress could explicity require the FCC
and the President to investigate the need for the use of particular
frequency bands for research and to set these bands aside for that
purpose, absent compelling reasons of public interest in favor of
some other use. There is a danger here: if Congress should try
specifically to address the particular needs of every service, it could
create an administrative nightmare for the FCC and for spectrum
users. The great virtue of the Communications Act as it is presently
written is the flexibility it provides. In an era of rapid technological
evolution, Congress should allow frequency management agencies
the ability to change the basis for their decisions, when new circumstances require such change. This does not mean that Congress
should attempt to provide no special guidance at all to the frequency management agencies when they must deal with widely
different uses of the spectrum, and especially with respect to a
matter of such great public importance as scientific research.

"See

Section I-B supra.

